FINAL EVALUATION: NEPAL EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY PROGRAMME

Final Report

Prepared by Key Aid Consulting for British Red Cross
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Executive Summary

On 25 April and 12 May 2015, earthquakes of the magnitudes 7.8 and 7.1 respectively struck Nepal, causing destruction in more than 50 districts. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) launched a large-scale, multi-sectoral relief intervention in the 14 most severely affected districts.

Starting in November 2015, the British Red Cross (BRC) partnered with the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) to implement a bilateral response that concentrated on recovery. This recovery programme followed the NRCS’ 4+1 Implementation Strategy (i.e. Shelter, Health, WASH and Livelihoods, as well as Community Engagement and Accountability). The BRC/NRCS response was implemented in the three districts of Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur, across 75 urban, peri-urban and rural communities. It occurred in two phases: Phase 2a lasted from November 2015 – April 2017, and Phase 2b from May 2017 – April 2018.

Funded by the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) for 5,006,601 GBP and an appeal from BRC, this recovery programme was implemented through the BRC/NRCS partnership, with BRC providing financial and technical support to NRCS’s implementation. As the DEC-funded activities concluded in April 2018, BRC has commissioned this external final evaluation. The purpose of this evaluation is to take stock of the BRC/NRCS recovery programme to provide feedback on its effects and outcomes, as well as on the value for money (VfM) of its operational model (i.e. the BRC/NRCS partnership).

Key Findings

Relevance

Community members and local stakeholders were generally included across the programming cycle. During the situation analysis implementers consulted communities and local stakeholders to determine the needs of the targeted populations, and collected input from different vulnerable groups. During the response analysis, communities and local stakeholders were

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1 Unless otherwise specified, NRCS will refer to NRCS staff working in the Earthquake Response Operation (ERO) structure for this recovery programme.

2 Phase 2a was implemented in 50 communities, but this was expanded to 75 in Phase 2b. BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018. At the time of writing the Phase 2 proposals VDCs were used. A new administration structure has subsequently been implemented that utilises municipalities that are comprised of wards. The new administrative structure has been used for programming and thus has been used for this evaluation.

3 Activities funded by the BRC Nepal earthquake appeal will continue until the end of 2018.
involved in designing activities across all sectors, such as influencing the targeting criteria. Lastly, communities and local stakeholders were involved in deciding where and how to carry out activities, and who met the targeting criteria during the implementation phase.

In general, the recovery programme’s interventions appear to have been relevant to the communities’ needs and beneficiaries reported being satisfied with the assistance they received. Each intervention included in the programme can be traced to a need identified either from the initial scoping study/the government’s PDNA, or BRC/NRCS’s MSA. Further community consultations also led to adapting the interventions, e.g. FGDs and KIIs to inform Phase 2b led to adding health camps with a focus on reproductive health. Local stakeholder KIIIs confirmed that these programme revisions helped to increase the programme’s relevance to the communities’ needs.

In terms of selecting wards, implementers focused on the most affected areas, the socio-economic status, where there were gaps in coverage, but also had to consider government and NRCS priorities. As nearly 90% of the selected wards were those considered to be the most affected, overall the selection of wards appears to have been appropriate.

For targeting beneficiaries, various activities used different targeting approaches; messaging activities aimed to reach as many in the community as possible, while direct assistance (e.g. cash grants, specialised training) has specific selection criteria. The use of vulnerability criteria however does not always appear to have been maximised, as was the case for CfW.

Compared to the other sectors, livelihoods was the most advanced in using vulnerability criteria for targeting. This evolved over the course of the programme as implementers moved away from the Red Card system to implement a ranking system based on identified vulnerabilities. However the Red Cross’ initial communication was not clear, which led to confusion/a lack of agreement on the specific vulnerability criteria and a sense that selection criteria were not fair. Following the use of CEA efforts (and revision of the initial beneficiary lists), KIIIs with programme implementers and local stakeholders generally agreed that the correct people received the livelihoods cash grants (citing a potential error for 5-10%).

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4 Health camps were added to Phase 2b based on community consultations to inform that phase of programming.
5 Ibid and KIIIs at HQ level.
6 “Cash For Work Guidance SOPs,” n.d. states it wants to include all vulnerable groups regardless of their caste, gender or ethnicity, but does not include specific selection criteria corresponding to these groups.
Effectiveness

While programme outputs are being met/exceeding targets, it is difficult to determine if programme outcomes are being achieved. This is because the outcome indicators do not have targets, and the end-line surveys have not yet been conducted. Anecdotal qualitative evidence however demonstrates that activities in each sector are helping to achieve the intended outcomes. Based on this evidence, it appears that the programme achieved significant progress towards helping targeted communities recover.

CEA was highlighted as a strength of the BRC/NRCS recovery programme. The evaluation found it was an effective two-way channel for feedback and improvement, with examples of it being used to change programming and beneficiaries’ behaviour. The example of the livelihoods cash grants demonstrates that CEA improved over the course of the programme: while the initial communication around targeting was insufficient, the feedback mechanisms demonstrated strong downward accountability to the beneficiaries.

Positive unintended effects of the programme included: contributing to a more CTP-conducive environment, women’s empowerment, increased financial inclusion, and strengthening the local economy. The main negative unintended effect was increased community tensions around targeting.

While beneficiaries felt that activities occurred in a timely manner and that the interventions consistently met their needs over time, programme implementers noted there were significant delays and revisions of the programme timeline. The main causes of delay were: the time it took to create and staff the ERO, the Government of Nepal’s slow pace for key guidance and approval, the ERO’s bureaucracy and slow decision-making process, and bureaucratic processes within BRC. As an external KII also noted all DEC members faced similar delays, it appears that some of these issues are more specific to the context and lack of on-the-ground humanitarian capacity than to the Red Cross.

VfM of the Operational Model

One efficiency driver is the long-standing nature of the BRC/NRCS partnership, as overtime it requires fewer resources to align work and can benefit from personal relationships. BRC and NRCS KIIIs were generally satisfied with the ways of working and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities.

Looking at cost-effectiveness, BRC provided adequate support for the recovery programme, which appears to have been a contributing factor to the programme’ success.

As the necessary scale of the recovery programme exceeded the capacity and experience of NRCS and BRC in Nepal at the beginning of the programme, both organisations needed to quickly scale up. The added value of BRC’s scale up was that they were able to fill in NRCS
capacity gaps, especially during the initial stages when NRCS was understaffed, and move programming forward.\(^7\)

Once NRCS filled the necessary ERO positions, BRC team members worked with their counterparts to provide technical and management support across the areas of intervention. In particular, BRC provided support (e.g. training/mentoring, review etc.) for CEA, CTP, WASH, Monitoring, Finance and Programme Management, identifying and managing risks, and ICB. Across these areas NRCS’ capacity to implement programming improved, as illustrated by fewer mistakes and BRC’s less frequent monitoring. However, remaining NRCS capacity gaps/areas for further improvement include targeting, monitoring, finance, and risks.

A source of BRC’s added value for coordination was its ability to work with external actors. A big accomplishment was the lack of overlap with other actors in the valley. BRC and Oxfam for instance worked together to prevent overlap and share lessons on cash grants in the valley. Another success was introducing NRCS to the cash coordination group.

Overall, given these examples of added value the evaluators feel that the operational model was cost-effective.

**Sustainability**

It seems that community level sustainability will largely rest on the capacity of volunteers, user committees and local governments to continue activities after the recovery programme ends. As refresher trainings for soft skills will likely be needed, the retention of trained volunteers will therefore be pivotal to the programme’s sustainability. Creating a database of volunteers that can be mobilised and follow up with new volunteers may not be sufficient, nor is it currently clear how this would be funded.

User committees and cooperatives generally appear willing and capable to continue programming, having been equipped with the technical and management skills. Their actual capacities however appear to vary, and there are concerns about securing the necessary financing particularly for infrastructure maintenance.

A potential threat to sustainability is the government restructuring, as services (e.g. agricultural and livestock training and insurance) move to the municipality level connections forged between beneficiaries and line ministries may be lost.

Another concern for the programme’s sustainability across sectors are the expectations of both communities and user committees of the assistance the government will provide. There are high expectations for continued activities and funding that will be expected of the government.

\(^7\) One BRC KII noted they brought in an external consultant to help lead the MSA.
when RCM ends programming. The willingness and capacity to take over activities appears to vary among government departments and ward secretaries.

As for NRCS, staff felt confident in their technical and management abilities to continue to implement and monitor the programme’s activities without further BRC support. The two main threats are 1) financing for similar types of activities and 2) staff retention as the ERO shuts down and reintegrates back into NRCS (who will not have the budget to keep on all of the staff).

**Recommendations**

**Situation analysis**

Recommendation: Ensure a timely comprehensive desegregated situation analysis that will systematically feed into response design (for BRC and NRCS). Conduct the MSA and RoA at the start of the programme, and ensure the needs of different groups’ as desegregated to help inform tailoring activities.

**Response analysis**

Recommendation: Envision multi-sectoral intervention as a single approach as opposed to parallel sectoral activities (for BRC and NRCS). Jointly conduct the RoA across sectors it identify cross-sectoral linkages from the beginning, consider joint risk identification, and share challenges and lessons learned across sectors. Also consider focusing on fewer outputs/activities rather than spreading too thinly.

Recommendation: ensure that programming is inclusive of all the different groups (for BRC and NRCS). This can inform not only which activities are the most appropriate for which audience, but also inform the selection criteria. Also consider providing UCGs directly to beneficiaries who are unable to undertake income generating activities themselves.

**Implementation**

Recommendation: Draw clear targeting criteria and methodologies from the situation analysis and make sure it is communicated clearly and transparently across recipients and non-recipients (for BRC and NRCS, communication specifically for NRCS). Use the MSA to further nuance the traditional ‘vulnerable groups’ and consider blanket targeting not as the go to option but only for specific activities such as messaging. Ensure committees charged with selecting beneficiaries have proper representation, and circulate criteria lists/ensure comprehensive CEA from the beginning of the activity.

Recommendation: Strengthen operational processes (for NRCS). Strengthen supply and finance processes by considering developing standing agreements with service providers and
updating existing manuals/policies to reflect the potential scale of future responses and the use of new modalities (i.e. CTP).

**Monitoring**

Recommendation: make sure monitoring allows for determining whether the response is reaching its target and is used to make programmatic decisions (for BRC and NRCS). Use the new MIS system to collect and analyse data on the programme’s reach to the targeted vulnerable groups. Analysing this kind of data can be used to ensure the programme is reaching the right beneficiaries, and allow implementers to alter their programming as needed.

Recommendation: Set targets for outcome indicators (for BRC and NRCS). Having targets will help the PMEAL team quantitatively determine whether outcomes are being achieved.

**Sustainability**

Recommendation: programme implementers should make sure to foster the appropriate linkages between community, committees and local government entities, and also ensure the roles and responsibilities of each are understood (for NRCS). During the transition volunteers and programme implementers should keep the community abreast of how the government’s restructuring affects where they need to go for further information or support. In addition, clarifying each actor’s role and responsibility after the BRC/NRCS programme ends will help to ensure the programme has not created unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved.

Recommendation: Consider the retention of staff and volunteers as a key factor for sustainability (for BRC and NRCS). Having been part of the ERO should be an important criteria for being selected as part of future programme team. Future NRCS and potential BRC programmes could also use the same community volunteers to keep them engaged.

Recommendation: Ensure guidance developed during this programme is documented to help foster institutional memory (for BRC and NRCS). In particular, lessons about how to tailor specific activities (PASSA, CfW, WASH infrastructure, etc.) to the urban context and what risks to consider should be consolidated and documented to assist future urban programming.

**CTP**

Recommendation: further encourage NRCS to be at the forefront of CTP in country (for BRC). Continue efforts to advocate for CTP in new sectors and support “champions” of CTP in NRCS. Empower NRCS to take a leadership role in cash advocacy and coordination, for instance by disseminating the cash-related SOP and guidance from this programme with the broader humanitarian community in country.
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRC</td>
<td>British Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCG</td>
<td>Conditional Cash Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Community Engagement and Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CfW</td>
<td>Cash for Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Cash Transfer Programming</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>Disaster Emergency Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPS</td>
<td>Earthquake Preparedness for Safer Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERO</td>
<td>Earthquake Recovery Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Households</td>
</tr>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Multi-Sector Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Reconstruction Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRCS</td>
<td>Nepal Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASSA</td>
<td>Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness</td>
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<td>Post-Distribution Monitoring</td>
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<td>PDNA</td>
<td>Post-Disaster Needs Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>Participatory Learning for Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLWD</td>
<td>People Living with Disabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoA</td>
<td>Response Options Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>VfM</td>
<td>Value for Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUC</td>
<td>Water User Committee</td>
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I. Introduction

On 25 April and 12 May 2015, earthquakes of the magnitudes 7.8 and 7.1 respectively struck Nepal, causing destruction in more than 50 districts. These earthquakes were the largest in the country in the past 80 years, and caused nearly 9,000 deaths and another 22,000 injuries. Their total destruction is estimated to have cost $171 million USD.\(^8\)

In the aftermath of the earthquake, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) launched a large-scale, multi-sectoral relief intervention in the most severely affected districts.\(^9\) This six-month relief phase provided basic need assistance in the areas of shelter, non-food items (NFI), as well as water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) through in-kind and Cash Based assistance.\(^10\) This response was in part funded by the British Red Cross.\(^11\)

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\(^9\) The IFRC Appeal covered all 23 districts under category A (most severely affected) and B (severely affected as per the Government label). The 14 Category A Districts were: Sindhuli, Gorkha, Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, Lalitpur, Rasuwa, Makwanpur, Nuwakot, Ramechhap, Okhaldunga, Kavre, Sindhupalchowk, Dolakha, Dhading. The 9 Category B Districts: Chitwan, Tanahu, Udayapur, Khotang, Solukhumbu, Kaski, Limjung, Bhojpur, Syangja. NRCS post earthquake intervention also included, with Tarpaulins distribution, another 18 districts (Dang, Morang, Sunsari, Illam, Panchthar, Dhenkuta, Palpa, Mustang, Nawalparasi, Parbat, Bara, Rupendhehi, Baglung, Parsa, Myagdi, Sanhuwasambe, Arghakhanchi, Gulmi).

\(^10\) BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 2 Phase 1 - Output Table BRC Nepal EQ,” 2015.

\(^11\) In the aftermath of the Nepal earthquakes, BRC raised a total of 18,700,000 GBP, of which DEC provided 6,257,798 GBP, DFID 3 million GBP and BRC appeal raised 9,392,934 GBP. BRC financially supported the IFRC both for the relief and response phases by channelling the DFID grant of 3 million GBP and another 6M GBP and the winterisation. BRC also financially supported the Danish Red Cross response.
In addition, starting in November 2015, the British Red Cross (BRC) partnered with the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS)\textsuperscript{12} to implement a bilateral response that concentrated on recovery. This recovery programme followed the NRCS’ 4+1 Implementation Strategy (i.e. Shelter, Health, WASH and Livelihoods, as well as Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA)), as outlined in NRCS’ Framework Agreement and the Red Cross Recovery Plan.\textsuperscript{13}

Funded by the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) for 5,006,601 GBP and an appeal from BRC, this recovery programme was implemented through the BRC/NRCS partnership, with BRC providing financial and technical support to NRCS’s implementation.

The BRC/NRCS response was implemented in the three districts of Kathmandu, Laluptur and Bhaktapur, across 75\textsuperscript{14} urban, peri-urban and rural communities. Activities that were part of the DEC funding occurred in two phases: Phase 2a lasted from November 2015 – April 2017, and Phase 2b from May 2017 – April 2018. It targeted the following number of beneficiaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Targeted beneficiaries per sector\textsuperscript{15}</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An overview of the recovery programme’s specific elements that are part of this evaluation (e.g. implemented with DEC funding) is provided in the figure below.

\textsuperscript{12} Unless otherwise specified, NRCS will refer to NRCS staff working in the Earthquake Response Operation (ERO) structure for this recovery programme.

\textsuperscript{13} NRCS Recovery Framework” (NRCS and BRC, 2015). Louise Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS),” 2017 appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{14} Phase 2a was implemented in 50 communities, but this was expanded to 75 in Phase 2b. BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018. At the time of writing the Phase 2 proposals VDCs were used. A new administration structure has subsequently been implemented that utilises municipalities that are comprised of wards. The new administrative structure has been used for programming and thus has been used for this evaluation.

\textsuperscript{15} The level of overlap in targeting is unknown and therefore it is not feasible to determine the overall number of targeted beneficiaries. At the time of this report data on the total number of people the programme reached for Phase 2b had not yet been shared with the evaluators. BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 8 - Phase 2 - Output Table Phase 2 Final,” 2017. BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 13 - Phase 2b - Output Table BRC,” 2018.

\textsuperscript{16} DEC does not have an option for CEA so the number of beneficiaries reached/planned is captured under capacity building.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Phase 2a</th>
<th>Phase 2b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>PASSA training</td>
<td>Train carpenters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training for masons and carpenters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OW for debris clearing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Climatisation / winterisation cash grants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>Seeds and tools cash grants</td>
<td>Conditional cash grants for agriculture, livestock and small business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conditional cash grants to restart income-generating activities</td>
<td>Technical support / training for agr, livestock and small enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training to restart income-generating activities</td>
<td>Cooperative management trainings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational trainings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WaSH</td>
<td>Repair water sources</td>
<td>Repair water sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train community volunteers on hygiene and sanitation</td>
<td>Distribute water tanks (schools and PLWD centres)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct hygiene and sanitation trainings / awareness-raising</td>
<td>Community sanitation events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Nutrition</td>
<td>Create trainers for community-based health promotion; psycho-support and organise community events</td>
<td>Community awareness raising for disease prevention and health promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train community mobilisers and FHOV on basic fist aid</td>
<td>Organise health camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raise awareness maternal and neonatal health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Beneficiaries have access to programme information, provide regular feedback, have two-way communication with the project, information is developed and disseminated with beneficiaries</td>
<td>Beneficiaries have access to programme information, provide regular feedback, information is developed and disseminated with beneficiaries, learning is applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICB</td>
<td>Enhance NRCS skills to facilitate recovery programming</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Branch Capacity Assessment workshops, DGs can better identify their capacity and needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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17 Sources: BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 8 - Phase 2 - Output Table Phase 2 Final,” 2017. BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 13 - Phase 2b - Output Table BRC,” 2018. As such, activities for Phase 2b may not be fully updated.
The various stakeholders involved in the programme are outlined in the figure below.

Figure 3: Overview of programme stakeholders

Specifically, for the participating local stakeholders:

- In Bhaktapur district, the District Disaster Response Committee (DDRC) was consulted on the selection criteria for targeting.
- The National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) at the district level and DUDBC were involved in monitoring shelter training activities. DUDBC provided the training certifications.
- The District Agricultural Services Office and the District Livestock Services Office were consulted during the activity design, and helped schedule and conduct technical trainings.
- The District Public Health Office helped plan health activities (e.g. developed action plan with NRCS) and sent FCHVs to Red Cross trainings.
- Ward government representatives provided feedback on planned activities, and participated in the targeting criteria selection and population beneficiary lists for the

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18 BRC in-country team implemented all activities except ICB through NRCS. All government entities involved in the programme were at field level were at the district, municipality or ward levels.
Livelihoods cash grants. They were also involved in managing beneficiaries’ complaints.

- Ward citizen forums were involved in population beneficiary lists.
- Water User Committees (WUC) participated in the assessment of location of water sources to rehabilitate and construct, select tap stand and intake well, mobilised labour and resources, monitored construction, and assumed responsibility for maintenance. WUC will take over the water points at the end of the intervention.
- School committees were involved in identifying small and medium scale structural mitigation activities, determining the relevant trainings’ duration, venue and participants, overseeing rain water harvesting and sanitation activities. Schools received assistance through the programme (water tanks and training).
- Public health centres / health posts helped organise and implement health camps and received assistance.
- Female Community Health Volunteers (FCHVs) received first aid training and participated in spreading health messaging and mobilising women to visit the health camps.
- Cooperative Management Department provider trainers to conduct the trainings on financial management.
- Disabled centres received assistance through the programme (water tanks and training).
- Insurance companies provided livestock insurance to relevant beneficiaries.
- Banks established temporary banks for relevant beneficiaries to be able to receive their cash grants.

As the DEC-funded activities concluded in April 2018, BRC has commissioned this external final evaluation.

II. Objectives and scope of the evaluation

The purpose of this DEC-required evaluation is to take stock of the BRC/NRCS recovery programme (Phases 2a and 2b, i.e. November 2015 – April 2018)) to provide feedback on its effects and outcomes, as well as on the value for money (VfM) of its operational model (i.e. the BRC/NRCS partnership). More specifically, the evaluation assesses the direct and indirect effects

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19 Conditional cash grants for agriculture, livestock and small enterprises.

20 Activities funded by the BRC Nepal earthquake appeal will continue until the end of 2018.
of the programme on the communities and its sustainability overtime. The four main axes of this evaluation are:

1. The appropriateness of the programme to meet the needs of the different crisis-affected groups;
2. The effectiveness of the programme to achieve results;
3. The VfM of the operational model;
4. The sustained significant changes in the lives of the crisis-affected population to which the programme contributed.

The evaluation focuses on the aspects of the BRC/NRCS’s recovery programme that were DEC-funded, which occurred from November 2015 – April 2018.21 While there are other elements of the BRC/NRCS programme that will continue after April 2018, they are under Appeal funding and thus are outside the scope of this evaluation.

As its primary purpose is learning, the evaluation looks at drifts of the implementation from the initial plan not necessarily as mistakes or failures, but as opportunities to better understand the mechanics of the programme and to adjust future policy and practice. The resulting recommendations aim to inform future BRC/NRCS programmes, as well as any remaining implementation as part of this response (under Appeal funding).

III. Methodology

III.1. Overview

The evaluation objectives were met through a participatory, mixed-method approach that relied on a variety of secondary and primary sources. It included a comprehensive desk review of 93 documents, looking at both project-related and relevant external sources. Quantitative data analysis for this evaluation relied on secondary data (e.g. monitoring information the programme implementers collected).

Qualitative primary data collection occurred from 24 April – 9 May. This included remote key informant interviews (KIs) and a field mission to Nepal to conduct in-person KIs at the HQ level. At the same time, the evaluation team’s national consultants conducted KIs and FGDs

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21 The consultancy team used the international evaluator's field mission to Nepal during the last week of April as the cut-off date for which aspects of the recovery programme are included in this evaluation.
with district-level stakeholders and beneficiaries. In total 63 KIIs and 20 FGDs were completed. This represents a significant increase in KIIs, as the original plan in the inception report was to conduct 40 KIIs. The detailed Methodology can be found in Annex XII.

III.2. Limitations:

The following limitations should be kept in mind while reading this report:

- While this evaluation covers all sectors (as well as CEA and ICB), the data collected did not equally cover each area of the programme. Specifically, quantitative data (e.g. monitoring information, post-distribution or exit surveys) was only provided for the Livelihoods sector. In addition, more HQ-level KIIs were conducted with staff in WASH and Livelihoods than Shelter and Health. The evaluators have included findings covering all programme areas to the greatest extent possible, but recognise that as a result of the focus of the data certain sectors may appear to have more examples provided than others.

- As the scope of this evaluation only focuses on DEC-funded activities, it does not provide a complete picture of the BRC/NRCS recovery programme. For instance, while Phase 2b did include capacity building elements, these were covered under the Appeal fund, and thus are not discussed in this report.

IV. Appropriateness of the programme to meet needs

IV.1. Involvement of target communities22

The original programme plan (as submitted to DEC for funding) was based on a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) the Government of Nepal conducted in May-June 2015, as well as a scoping study BRC/NRCS carried out in July-September 2015. 23 The programme implementers conducted a Multi-Sector Assessment (MSA) six months into Phase 2a, and held

22 For this section, “communities” is understood to encompass potential beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, local government officials, committee members (e.g. Water User Committee), and other local stakeholders as identified in Section I.

23 BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 7 Phase 2a Narrative Plan British Red Cross,” 2015.
a Response Options Analysis (RoA) workshop in April 2016 to redesign the programme (as needed). This section details how the programme consulted and included communities and local stakeholders in developing and implementing the programme.

**IV.1.1. Situation Analysis**

The programme consulted communities and local stakeholders to determine the needs of the targeted populations. Both the initial scoping study and the MSA utilised FGDs with community members, which were inclusive of various groups, e.g. elderly, Dalit, Janajtai, women, youth, and people living with disabilities (PLWD). The needs assessment process also included KIIs with relevant local stakeholders, such as government officials, women’s cooperative or relevant committees’ representatives. Water User Committees (WUC) were equally involved in conducting water mapping to determine which taps needed to be refurbished or built.

The situation analysis did however not include a market assessment in its first iteration. To inform response design, the programme implementers looked at both vocational training and the labour market through MSA. Those market systems are both related to income (as opposed to supply) and as such traditionally more difficult to assess. This light touch market angle was likely not sufficient to fully capture market stakeholders’ views.

Lastly, BRC reportedly conducted a **cash feasibility assessment** to inform the Livelihoods interventions after the Seeds and Tools cash grants. According to BRC KIIs and documentation from the RoA workshop, BRC collected information on beneficiary preference when determining whether to use cash grants in the Livelihood sector. BRC KIIs also reported that

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*24 BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2a Final Report (Narrative),” 2017. confirmed by field and HQ KIIs and FGDs.
27 A market assessment was conducted in December 2015 after the disbursement of the first cash grants (UCG for winterization). NRCS and BRC, “Rapid Market Assessment Report (Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur Districts),” 2015.
29 One KII from Bhaktapur noted that in 2016 that BRC/NRCS conducted KIIs and FGDs with the cooperative division office and the cottage industry to identify if training were needed/demanded by the population, but the consultants were not able to triangulate this information with other sources.
30 Documented was requested by consultants but not shared.
31 “Preliminary Livelihoods Analysis Presentation, ERO Assessment Kathmandu Valley,” 2016.*
beneficiaries were consulted on their preference when deciding to use cash for winterisation and CfW for debris clearing.\footnote{Using cash for the Seeds and Tools cash grants was based on the assessment conducted prior to the recovery phase. “Scoping Mission Report Bhaktapur District,” 2015.}

**IV.1.2. Response Analysis**

It is important to note that the NRCS had developed the 4+1 framework prior to the programme’s situation analysis, and thus the design of the programme informed the situation analysis assessments (rather than vice versa). Some BRC KIIIs felt that this curtailed efforts to include the community in planning the programme, as their priorities and needs had to be allocated to pre-defined sectors or omitted.

The communities’ identified needs that fit the 4+1 framework were taken into consideration during the Response Options Analysis (RoA) workshop in April 2016, which finalised the programme’s design.\footnote{Ibid.} While RoA documentation suggests that communities were given an opportunity to identify their preferred potential activities prior to the workshop,\footnote{Ibid.} it is unclear whether communities systemically had an opportunity to do so. While there are documented priority activities identified for Shelter and WASH,\footnote{“Assessment Findings, Analysis, and Recommendations (RoA Shelter and WASH),” 2016.} it seems that communities did not have this opportunity for CEA: the CHS Review\footnote{Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS).” As stated in the CHS Review, this finding relates to CHS commitment 5.1.} noted that the programme implementers did not initially consult communities on how they preferred to provide feedback (specifically through a hotline vs. in-person).\footnote{Community consultation improved over the course of the programme, see Sections IV.2.1 and V.1.3 for more information.}

It also appears that the programme attempted to involve the community in designing activities once selected. For instance, communities were involved in deciding what health and hygiene messages to use for street dramas and murals (even if they were not necessarily involved in deciding to use these activities in the first place). Similarly, communities played an active role in determining the venues for mason trainings and prioritising and selecting water taps
locations, even determining their aesthetic design to help them blend in with the area’s cultural heritage (according to BRC and NRCS KIIs).

One area where **both communities and local stakeholders were involved in programme design** was determining the **targeting criteria**, particularly for CfW and the Livelihoods conditional cash grants for agriculture, livelihoods and small enterprises (hereinafter Livelihoods cash grants). According to KII, programme implementers presented the core criteria to the municipality and ward governments, who then had the opportunity to provide inputs and add additional ones. Next, community leaders and/or representatives (e.g. a committee of community members) also had the opportunity to provide feedback on the selection criteria.

Beyond targeting criteria, local government actors were involved in designing other aspects of the programme. According to local stakeholder KII, district-level line ministries and ward representatives had the opportunity to provide feedback on the Red Cross’ planned activities and helped finalise the plans.

Given the examples above, the response analysis process allowed for community and local stakeholder participation. While this can be seen as a good practice, local stakeholders, as well as some BRC KII, noted they would have **encourage even more inclusion of local stakeholder groups and communities in the initial planning phase**. This seems to refer to the fact that BRC/NRCS selected the programme’s activities and then asked stakeholders to approve or suggest changes, rather than involving them in the initial activity selection. It could also be due to the timing, as six months of programme implementation had already passed by the time the MSA and RoA workshop occurred.

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39 They were however involved in determining the initial sites for water taps. The need to follow government technical standards led programme implementers to instead use WUCs for this selection process. BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018 and BRC KII. According to feedback from NRCS, this process also used an external consultant to conduct a pre-feasibility study and develop an initial list of potential projects.
40 “Cash For Work Guidance SOPs,” n.d.
41 With BRC, NRCS and local stakeholders.
42 For instance local authorities were included determining the venues for mason trainings. NRCS, “Guiding Note for Earthquake Resistant Building Construction (ERBC) Training Rollout,” 2016. They were also involved in creating the CfW work plans “Cash For Work Guidance SOPs,” n.d.
IV.1.3. Implementation

Communities and local stakeholders were involved in deciding where and how to carry out activities, and who met the targeting criteria. Local stakeholders reported a high satisfaction with their level of involvement during implementation, and in particular with NRCS’ communication and efforts to keep them abreast of response updates.

KII, FGDs and documentation provided a number of examples of community members’ engagement in determining how specific activities would be conducted, such as determining the timing and location of mason trainings. Community members played an active role in conducting certain interventions, for instance providing the labour for building water taps, serving as the actors in street dramas or organising the work for the CfW schemes.

Targeting was again an area that included both the community and local stakeholders. Community representatives helped to populate the beneficiary selection lists for the Livelihoods cash grants, which ward secretaries then approved. They also helped identify potential participants for the mason trainings. The community at large then had an opportunity to provide feedback on the beneficiary lists that were publicly showcased. This process is further detailed in Section V.1.3.

An overview of how various local stakeholders were involved in implementation is provided in Section I. For instance, WUCs were in charge of mobilising labour to construct the water taps and to gather 20% of the need materials locally. They also provided oversight and monitoring of water tap construction/rehabilitation.

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44 Ibid., BRC, NRCS and local stakeholder KII and FGDs.
IV.2. Relevance of the interventions to target communities’ needs

IV.2.1. Activities’ alignment to identified needs

In general, the recovery programme’s interventions appear to have been relevant to the communities’ needs. As illustrated in the figure below, each intervention included in the programme can be traced to a need identified either from the initial scoping study/the government’s PDNA, or BRC/NRCS’s MSA.47

Figure 4: Mapping of Identified Needs and Outputs48

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47 Health camps were added to Phase 2b based on community consultations to inform that phase of programming.

48 PDNA and scoping study identified needs as highlighted in BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 7 Phase 2a Narrative Plan British Red Cross,” 2015. MSA identified needs as highlights in RoA documentation.
While the RoA found that the original design’s activities were still generally relevant, documentation and KII with BRC and NRCS staff also highlighted that the RoA provided an
opportunity to add/change activities to address newly identified needs. After the MSA, changes the RoA implemented included creating a three-fold PASSA approach; developing training on entrepreneurship, business and micro-enterprise, and doing a training-of-trainers (ToT) in first aid and psychosocial support, among others.  

Further community consultations also led to adapting the interventions, e.g. FGDs and KIIs to inform Phase 2b led to adding health camps with a focus on reproductive health. Implementers also increased face-to-face CEA consultations based on feedback collected for the CHS Review that it was the preferred method (e.g. introducing FGDs on WaSH activities). Local stakeholder KIIs confirmed that these programme revisions helped to increase the programme’s relevance to the communities’ needs.

Overall, FGD participants and local stakeholders felt that the interventions helped communities meet their needs. In general, beneficiaries, across different groups, reported being satisfied with the assistance they received, and did not mention any remaining unmet needs, Yet, beyond livelihoods, documentation from the RoA does not systematically disaggregate different groups’ needs and priorities to determine how they may differ. While participants have reportedly been satisfied, the lack of desegregated assessment and then analysis could have led to missed opportunity to further tailor programme design.

Furthermore, as documentation and KIIs noted, some activities were not initially relevant to urban contexts and had to be adapted. Programme implementers determined that CfW for debris clearing was less appropriate in the more highly-urbanised contexts: BRC was not willing to engage in more costly and specialised demolition and unskilled labour were not prepared to safely demolish high and large structures. As a result of this, as well as community challenges

50 All documented changes are explained in ibid.
51 Ibid and KII at HQ level.
52 “Focus Group Discussion on WASH Earthquake Recovery Programme in Kathmandu Valley,” 2017. According to BRC feedback these types of activities were increased after the CHS Review.
53 “Livelihoods Recovery Assessment, Kathmandu Valley” (NRCS and BRC, 2016). E.g. this report notes high unemployment among youth, so there is a resulting activity for vocational training.
54 Based on RoA documentation. Scoping study documentation was not shared with the evaluators.
55 The CHS Review noted there was a “lack of evidence of a systematic process for identifying vulnerable groups, analysing the nature of vulnerabilities; and tailor program activities and ways of working to vulnerable groups.” Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) p. 4.” As stated in the CHS Review, this finding relates to CHS commitment 1.2, 2.1, 4.3.
(e.g. HHs that had already cleared their debris retroactively demanding money) CfW activities were discontinued in Kathmandu.57

IV.2.2. Determining the intervention modality58

As discussed in Section IV.1.2, when determining whether to use cash, programme implementers considered beneficiary selection, as well as market functionality, to some extent, during the situation analysis and response option process. A scoping study59 conducted before the recovery programme also notes that financial service providers were assessed. The implementer’s complete decision-making process on cash’s appropriateness however has not been formalised/colllected in one document, and specifically the RoA documentation does not provide evidence of considering political acceptance,60 delivery mechanisms, operational considerations or value for money.

Over the course of the programme it appears these elements were considered, as the SoP on Cash Transfers61 covers all cash appropriateness aspects. In addition, the fact that the Livelihoods cash grants utilised a range of delivery mechanisms (bank transfers, account cheques and bearers’ cheques) demonstrates that this aspect was indeed assessed: the inclusion of A/C Payee and bearer cheques stemmed from beneficiaries’ feedback, which illustrated that the elderly and PLWDs were facing difficulties in opening bank accounts.62 Adding new delivery mechanisms appears to have been an important element for increasing beneficiary access, as the graphs below illustrate bank transfers were only used for a minority of participants.

57 Brick production units were also discontinued as according to one BRC KII they were not appropriate to the context (though no documented reason for discontinuing this activity was provided to explain why).
58 As per the Inception Report, looking at different options for interventions will focus on choice of modality (e.g. in-kind, cash or voucher).
60 According to NRCS KIIs, cash was not considered for activities beyond Livelihoods and NFI due to the lack of government acceptance.
62 BRC KIIs.
For other interventions that used cash grants (e.g. vocational training, winterisation cash grants, Seeds and Tools), it provided the additional benefit of overcoming NRCS’ logistical challenges (e.g. the slow procurement process as further detailed in Section V.2).  

Looking at CfW for debris clearing, the modality choice was appropriate in terms of providing meaningful work that needed to be completed. However, the fact that the activity had to be stopped in certain urban contexts suggests that using this modality was not the best fit in those areas.

IV.3. Appropriateness of targeting criteria

IV.3.1. Targeting locations

As the three districts where BRC/NRCS implemented their recovery programming were among the 14 Category A Districts, the selection of districts was appropriate and targeted the most affected areas.  

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According to BRC and NRCS HQ KIs, in general cash was chosen because it was a faster option than in-kind.

Determined by the government as the most affected areas. See Section I.

Selection determined by NRCS.
The selection of the initial 50 wards\(^67\) within those Districts occurred during the initial scoping exercise. The main criteria included a) the extent of damage caused by the earthquake, b) socio-economic vulnerability of the communities,\(^68\) c) areas where BRC was already operating and d) where there were gaps in coverage from other organisations.\(^69\)

However, as the Ward Selection Report for Kathmandu Valley\(^70\) document notes, another “core” criteria were the priorities of District Chapters (DCs) and ward representatives. This report notes that certain wards were chosen even though they were less affected because they were “strategically important for the chapters.”\(^71\) A BRC KII who was involved at the time corroborated that negotiations with district governments played a role in the final ward selection. Of the 43\(^72\) initially selected wards, only five of them (e.g. 11.6% of the wards) did not meet the stated main vulnerability criteria of shelters being damaged.\(^73\) As nearly 90% of the selected wards were those considered to be the most affected, overall the selection of wards appears to have been appropriate.

Phase 2b extended from 50 to 75 wards to account for other identified unmet needs, including in areas where the Red Cross had not already engaged.\(^74\) For the selection of the remaining 25 wards, the main factors were the vulnerability criteria (in terms of socio-economic factors), affectedness (e.g. the number of HH still in temporary shelters or the concentration of damaged or destroyed homes), and where coverage had lapsed.\(^75\) For this group of additional wards it is not clear to the evaluators the extent to which the final list of selected wards matches the most affected areas.\(^76\)

\(^67\) At the time these were VDCs but this report uses the term “ward” for consistency.

\(^68\) BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 7 Phase 2a Narrative Plan British Red Cross,” 2015.

\(^69\) BRC KII and “EQ Recovery Programme Ward Selection- Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur” (NRCS and BRC, n.d.).

\(^70\) Ibid.

\(^71\) Ibid., p. 3.

\(^72\) While BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018 says 50 wards were selected, “EQ Recovery Programme Ward Selection- Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur” (NRCS and BRC, n.d.) only refers to 43 wards.

\(^73\) “EQ Recovery Programme Ward Selection- Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur” (NRCS and BRC, n.d.).


\(^76\) Ranking of wards information shared with the evaluators seems to be only relevant for the initial 50 wards.
IV.3.2. **Targeting beneficiaries**

Interviewed local stakeholders reported that **targeting was the most frequently cited challenge of the programme.** Some noted it was difficult to determine who were the most needy and who met the criteria, as at the time it appeared that everyone in the community needed assistance.

**IV.3.2.1. Use of vulnerability criteria**

As per BRC and NRCS KIIs, NRCS’ regular approach (which followed the government’s normal approach) to targeting was to provide blanket coverage to people who possess government Red Cards.\(^77\) During this programme BRC helped NRCS to look beyond the Red Card system and include vulnerability-based criteria. As can be seen in Table 4 in Annex X (which provides an overview of the various types of targeting criteria the programme used), various activities used different targeting approaches; messaging activities aimed to reach as many in the community as possible, while direct assistance (e.g. cash grants, specialised training) has specific selection criteria. The use of vulnerability criteria however does not always appear to have been maximised – for instance the CfW SoP states it wants to include all vulnerable groups regardless of their caste, gender or ethnicity, but does not include specific selection criteria corresponding to these groups.\(^78\)

In general however, KIIs with programme implementers and local stakeholders and FGDs noted that the right people were targeted across the various activities.

**IV.3.2.1. Vulnerability targeting: livelihoods**

Compared to the other sectors, livelihoods was the most advanced in using vulnerability criteria for targeting. This evolved over the course of the programme, since while the first cash grants (Seeds and Tools) included vulnerability criteria (e.g. household headed by a PLWD, single female or widow, etc.), all beneficiaries had to be Red Card holders (as required by the government). This meant that a beneficiary had to own at least 1 ropani of farmable land.\(^79\)

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\(^77\) Red Card system was only used for the Seeds and Tools cash grants.

\(^78\) “Cash For Work Guidance SOPs,” n.d.

\(^79\) “Kathmandu Valley Integrated Urban Recovery Programme Post Distribution Monitoring and Exit Survey Report Cash Grants for Seeds and Tools” (BRC and NRCS, 2016). One district level KII in Kathmandu noted that this type of criteria was not emphasised and that landless who farmed leased land were also targeted, but this point was not corroborated by other sources of information.
which automatically excluded the landless/those owning less land from receiving assistance (as BRC KIIs confirmed).

Recognising that relying on the Red Card system was not appropriate for ensuring the most affected were included, programme implementers focused entirely on vulnerability criteria for the following livelihoods cash grants. They used a ranking system to select the specific beneficiaries. The criteria used are outlined in the table in Annex X. However, as evident from the KIIs with various programme implementers and stakeholders, there was still some confusion/a lack of agreement on the specific vulnerability criteria included. FGDs confirmed that the selection criteria were not fully clear, and as such some found that it did not initially appear to be fair.

Using a community participatory approach for targeting has the potential to increase buy-in. Yet, local stakeholders and BRC KIIs admitted that some community members tried to influence targeting decisions to include his/her family and friends. A FGD from the CHS Review also felt that not all community members could equally influence the decisions, with male community representatives appearing to have more influence than women.

Following the use of CEA efforts (as further detailed in Section V.1.3), KIIs with programme implementers and local stakeholders generally agreed that the correct people received the Livelihoods cash grants (citing a potential error for 5-10%). Most FGDs also generally agreed the targeting process was fair and primarily aimed at assisting the most needy. Yet, four of the 20 (25%) of the FGDs noted that some of the most vulnerable were originally missed out from the selection process. They were also less confident than programme implementers that non-beneficiaries understand the selection criteria, even after further CEA efforts to explain it to the community. They did note however that the most recent round of applications to be included in the Livelihoods cash grants meant these people were now being considered, which coincides with the exit survey report highlighting that only 8% of the consulted people think that some households were missed in the selection process.

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80 Six out of 20 FGDs (30%) noted that they were not clear on the selection criteria. Another six KIIs also noted the selection criteria were not clear to the community. This appears to reflect views held at the end of the programme, e.g. even after further CEA efforts to clarify.

81 Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS).”
V. Effectiveness of the programme in achieving results

V.1. Programme achievements and shortcomings

V.1.1. Sectoral outcome achievement and contributing outputs

According to monitoring data shared with the evaluators, the programme’s outputs are being achieved. Some outputs, e.g. winterisation cash grants, mason training, Seeds and Tools cash grants, PASSA orientations, and Livelihoods cash grants, had even surpassed their targets. KIIs with BRC and NRCS were confident that the remaining activities under DEC funding would be completed by the end of April 2018.

It has been more difficult for the evaluation team to assess whether the BRC/NRCS recovery programme achieved intended outcomes. The first challenge is that NRCS’s outcome level indicators do not have targets or usable end-lines to be compared with existing baselines (except for Livelihoods), as demonstrated in the table below.

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82 BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 8 - Phase 2 - Output Table Phase 2 Final,” 2017. BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 13 - Phase 2b - Output Table BRC,” 2018. Final monitoring data for Phase 2b was not available during the time of data collection.
84 The programme does not appear to have other outcome indicators, since neither DEC nor the BRC UK Major Programming Board requires them. In addition, NRCS’ CEA outcome does not have an indicator.
85 The finalised baseline report was not ready to be shared at the time of data collection.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>the capacity of affected HHs to build safer and durable shelter solutions is enhanced</td>
<td>% of households living in shelters meeting agreed standards for shelter (as according to Nepal Government shelter guideline)</td>
<td>Not provided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| WaSH        | Improved access to water and improved hygiene and sanitation practices at HH and community level in targeted area / Access to water and sanitation is restored in target communities across the Kathmandu valley. | % of target population that both has access to and uses sustainable safe water supply  
% of target population using sanitation facilities  
% of target population that are practicing proper hygiene behaviours  
# of wards confirmed Open Defecation Free by the end of the project | Not provided                                |
| Livelihoods | Earthquake-affected vulnerable communities have restored, strengthened and/or improved their food security and income generation | % of beneficiary HHs that report an increase in income generation capacity  
% HHs that report an increase in food security  
% HH that have started livelihood activities based on  
70% HHs report increase in come generation\(^{88}\)  
60% HH report increase food security  
\(^{88}\) Target is 60\% for the Seeds and Tools cash grant.
The second challenge is that **outcome-level monitoring has thus far been inconsistent**. Only some Livelihoods activities have information on how they are meeting these indicators. For instance, the Seeds and Tools cash grants exceeded its target, as 62% of respondents said the cash grants moderately helped them meet their food and economic needs. The most recent round of Livelihood cash grants have the indicator/target “90% HH that have started livelihood

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87 Only relevant for the livelihoods cash grants, and considered an immediate outcome indicator.

89 “M&E Strategy and Guidelines – Cash for Winter Cropping Support Earthquake Recovery Operations (ERO) – Kathmandu Valley” (NRCS and BRC, 2016). also includes % of HH that save seed stocks for the next harvest season with a target of >60% as an outcome indicator, but no data has been provided on this indicator in “Kathmandu Valley Integrated Urban Recovery Programme Post Distribution Monitoring and Exit Survey Report Cash Grants for Seeds and Tools” (BRC and NRCS, 2016).
activities based on activity plan and received the second instalment,” with Lalitpur at 99.87%; Bhaktapur at 99.39% and Kathmandu at 99.53%. Other than these examples, current BRC/NRCS monitoring focuses on how many people the various activities have reached, but does not systematically collect information to measure the outcomes indicators. BRC and NRCS HQ staff noted that this type of information will be collected during the end-lines surveys, but these have not yet been conducted. As a result, it is not feasible at this stage for the evaluators to determine whether the intended outcomes have been met.

To mitigate this lack of outcome monitoring, programme implementers have implemented qualitative methods to collect examples of how the outputs are contributing to achieving sectoral outcomes. This anecdotal evidence tends to demonstrate that activities in each sector are helping to achieve the intended outcomes. Specifically:

In livelihoods, the combination of livelihood cash grants and technical (or vocational) training have helped to increase HH income and improve their level of economy. FGDs noted they are now able to sell their agricultural products, rather than only using them for their families’ needs, to generate more income. With the additional income, they are for instance able to send their children to school. For the seeds and tools cash grants, the PDM report noted that “overall the cash grants for seeds and tools were found to be effective in supporting affected families to grow crops for food and economic security.”

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91 NRCS has traditionally been collecting output level information and DEC reportedly does not require systematic outcome monitoring. The lack of outcome monitoring also appears in the One Movement Plan, despite the significant PMEAL technical support BRC provided to the Plan (see Section VI.2.1 for more information). Qualitative data monitoring is further discussed below.  
92 E.g. documented examples corroborated by KIs.  
93 CEA achievement will be discussed in Section V.1.3 and ICB in Section VI.2.  
95 Example provided by a local stakeholder KII.  
In **WaSH**, district level KII confirm documented examples\(^97\) of behavioural change. Specifically, students have improved their hygiene, by washing their hands and having their overall appearance be more tidy. In centres for PLWD, a noted change has been the purification of rain water before consumption. KII found that community sanitation has improved and people have become more aware of their personal hygiene. FGD members reported to be more aware of how to adequately wash their hands and how to avoid waterborne diseases.

FGDs and KII also confirmed that constructed water taps have improved the communities' access to water. A cited major improvement has been the reduction in time required to get water from over an hour to 10-15 minutes, and the need to only travel to the water tap once a day to meet families' water needs.\(^98\) Documented evidence\(^99\) and the lack of complaints from FGDs also suggest that the quality and quantity of water is now sufficient.

In **Shelter**, the winterisation UCGs helped beneficiaries cope with the cold weather.\(^100\) For mason training, the majority of trained masons have found jobs and are helping to build earthquake-resilient homes.\(^101\) FGDs conducted in September-October 2017 found beneficiaries had good levels of safe shelter construction awareness,\(^102\) while FGDs for this evaluation noted they had been building earthquake resistant houses. In addition, multiple local stakeholder KII and FGDs cited the CfW for debris clearing as a useful activity to prepare for rebuilding homes.\(^103\)

In **Health**, local KII noted the health camps helped foster more awareness about reproductive health and have helped women detect diseases that were previously unknown. FGDs proved

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\(^{98}\) The “Focus Group Discussion on WASH Earthquake Recovery Programme in Kathmandu Valley,” 2017 cited change form over an hour to 10-15 minutes.

\(^{99}\) Ibid.

\(^{100}\) “Nepal Earthquake Interim Narrative Report Seasonal Assistance” (DRC and BRC, 2015).

\(^{101}\) BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018, confirmed by FGDs. “Mason Post Training Follow Up Report” (NRCs and BRC, 2017) notes that 91% of train masons were working as masons in Kathmandu, 94% in Lalitpur, and 90% in Bhaktapur in November 2017.

\(^{102}\) Ibid.

\(^{103}\) Programme implemenenters decided not to provide cash grants, even though shelter reconstruction emerged as a major need in both the PDNA and MSA, due to the complex environment of land entitlements in its three districts (according to BRC KII). Instead they opted for preparing the community for rebuilding when they received the government’s cash grants,
that community members have better knowledge of first aid practices, and expressed appreciation for the psycho-social support the programme provided.

These examples of effect are largely due to the introduction of qualitative monitoring, specifically using Most Significant Change (MSC). They do not however provide an overview of the activities’ effect across the targeted population. Thus, while the qualitative data appears positive in terms of how outputs are contributing to outcome achievement, this will need to be confirmed by the end-line surveys to be conducted.

Other than the activities that were discontinued (e.g. CfW in Kathmandu), project implementers, local stakeholders and beneficiaries did not identify any outputs that were not contributing towards the achievement of the intended outcomes.

One possible exception may be the carpenter trainings. A KII from the NRA noted that their monitoring only found 50% of participants trained as masons or carpenters were now working in those fields. Given that the Mason Post Training Follow-up Report found that more than 90% of trained masons were still engaged in masonry work in November 2017, the issue perhaps may be more associated with carpenters. This appears to be corroborated by a BRC KII who mentioned that the carpenter trainings have not yet proved to be as effective as anticipated, since it has been difficult to get communities to move away from the culturally-appropriate wooden frames and use new construction methods with steel or other fibres.

Lastly, FGDs attributed better housing construction practices to the mason training they received, but did not specifically attribute any improvements to the carpentry training.

V.1.2. Programme’s reach and effect on the most vulnerable groups

According to KII s with implementers and local stakeholders, the programme has been effective at reaching various vulnerable groups. Documentation confirms that both activities specifically targeting these groups, as well as ones that used more of a blanket approach, indeed reached

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104 The nature of not being completed renders these activities as non-contributions to outcome achievement.

FGDs with members of various vulnerable groups also corroborated that they participated in activities in all sectors.

As the data available for this evaluation only provides examples, rather than a more comprehensive overview, it is difficult to determine whether the programme’s reach to vulnerable groups was sufficient. In addition, as discussed in Section V.1.1, it is not feasible at this stage to determine the programme’s overall effect on these groups (as end-line surveys have not yet been conducted). When looking at the available monitoring evidence, the effect on vulnerable groups does not differ from the overall community. For instance, PDM data from the seeds and tools cash grants demonstrates the intervention had a similar effect on women as men, as seen in the graph below.

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106 E.g. For instance, according to DEC monitoring information, in Bhaktapur 75% of the HHs that received the Livelihoods cash grants during Phase 2a were either PLWDs, Dalit, Janajati, or senior citizens, and 76% of the beneficiaries were female. BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2a Final Report (Narrative),” 2017. During Phase 2b, in Kathmandu 21% of the Livelihoods cash grant beneficiaries were 60 years or older, and 45% of households who received both instalments were Janajati. BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018. KIIs confirmed that health posts with maternal health reached women, etc. Further examples provided in Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS).” As stated in the CHS Review, this finding relates to CHS commitment 1.2, 2.1, 3.1, 3.3, 4.3.

107 For blanket approach targeting activities: in Bhaktapur, more than two-thirds of the CfW participants were either PLWDs, Dalit, Janajati, or senior citizens. In Kathmandu, three water taps in Lalitpur were built in Janajati communities. BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2a Final Report (Narrative),” 2017.
One example of an effect that appears more unique to a specific vulnerable group was the inclusion of elderly persons in CfW schemes. Their participation in less labour-intensive activities not only provided them with an income, but also reportedly created a reason for them to leave their homes hence improving their mental health.  

V.1.3. Communication, feedback and complaints

The recovery programme utilised multiple communication methods and channels to deliver messaging to and receive feedback from programme beneficiaries. The figure below provides an overview.

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109 Example provided by NRCS KII.
BRC, NRCS and local stakeholder KII s highlighted CEA as a strength of the BRC/NRCS recovery programme. The evaluation uncovered examples of programming changes based on community feedback, such as adding more WASH messaging on waterborne diseases. An example from a NRCS HQ KI where implementers used Q&A sessions to help the WUCs understand and take responsibility for the water taps demonstrates that CEA was used as a two-way channel for feedback and improvement.

CEA improved over the course of the programme and supported improvement in the implementation of the response. An illustrative example was the first round of targeting for the livelihoods cash grants that was introduced in Section IV.3.2.1. The CHS Review found that not sharing information in a comprehensive fashion led communities to think the beneficiary

\[\text{Figure 5: CEA activities}^{110}\]

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selection process was unfair.\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, FGDs for this evaluation noted that the lack of explanation on targeting led to rumours and misunderstandings of who would be included. The lack of initial communication generated a sharp increase in feedback and complaints.\textsuperscript{113} Following this high level of feedback, the programme implementers revisited and revised the list of beneficiaries, adding people that met the criteria that were initially missed and removing those who were inappropriately included. BRC/NRCS also increased CEA activities to better explain the targeting criteria to the communities, specifically through using social mobilisers to conduct community meetings. The effectiveness of these efforts appears to be mixed: KIIs at the HQ level felt these efforts were sufficient, as evidenced by the reduction in complaints about beneficiary targeting for the second round of livelihood cash grants. FGDs and KIIs with local stakeholders however note that some non-beneficiaries remained unclear about the reasons for not being targeted.

As this example demonstrates, the established feedback and complaint systems appear to have been effective. FGDs demonstrated that beneficiaries were aware of how to provide feedback on the programme, and FGDs were unanimous in their satisfaction with how the Red Cross handled the process. Across all FGDs, the main method beneficiaries cited for providing feedback was directly contacting social mobilisers or local Red Cross staff. Feedback provided through the hotline, suggestion boxes and MSC meetings are captured in DEC reporting. Aggregating both formal and informal feedback helped to harness and institutionalise learning from an area that is generally considered to be a strength of the programme.

\textsuperscript{112} Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS).” As stated in the CHS Review, this finding relates to CHS commitments 4.1 and 4.2.

\textsuperscript{113} BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018. From May-October 2017, the NRCS hotline received 124 calls, of which 86% were related to the livelihoods sector. 84% of those calls were complaints about beneficiary selection. According to BRC KIIs, within a few weeks of publicly posting the beneficiary lists they collected over 800 comments in suggestion boxes concerning the targeting for the cash grants, which represented a massive increase in feedback. Many of the questions related to why the same group of people received a second cash grant when others had received no assistance, which suggests that beneficiaries did not understand that the livelihoods cash grants were split over two instalments (e.g. they did not understand the programme, which suggests a weakness in the original communication).
The CHS Review also noted that beneficiaries felt safe providing feedback to programme implementers. Overall, the feedback mechanisms demonstrate strong downward accountability to the beneficiaries.

V.1.4. Positive and negative unintended outcomes

The evaluation uncovered a number of positive unintended outcomes of the programme, which are detailed below.

Contributing to a more CTP-conducive environment. The winterisation cash grants were one of the first examples of cash the Red Cross Movement (RCM) used at scale in Nepal. BRC and NRCS key informants credit this programme with helping to increase the Government of Nepal’s and the NRCS’s management acceptance of cash, as it demonstrated the benefits of cash while assuaging their fears. Overall, the programme appears to have contributed to the overall increasingly conducive environment for cash grants in Nepal.

KII, particularly with NRCS staff, demonstrated however that there is still more room to improve cash acceptance. A number of stakeholder KII at the district level questioned the use of cash for this programme instead of in-kind assistance. In addition, even among NRCS HQ KII where cash acceptance appeared to be higher, there was significant resistance to considering unconditional cash grants (UCG) except for immediate relief. Lastly, cash was only considered for the livelihoods sector and non-food items (NFI), as according to NRCS KII there is little government appetite to use cash in other sectors.

Women’s empowerment. FGDs and KII with local stakeholders agreed that participating in the recovery programme contributed to building women’s self-esteem and confidence. According to these sources, the main contributing factors were the fact that women were now making an income, and that they had a public forum (the meetings with RCM staff or social mobilisers) where they could actively participate.

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114 Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS).” As stated in the CHS Review, this finding relates to CHS commitments 4.4, 5.2, 5.3.

115 BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 11 Phase 2 BRC 6 Month Narrative Report,” 2016. E.g. 95% of the cash grants were used for their intended purposes and not on anti-social activities such as alcohol.

Another area of the programme that empowered women was the mason trainings. Although the activity did not initially intentionally target women,\textsuperscript{117} the trainings appear to have increased their economic and social status and allowed them to earn an equal wage as male masons.\textsuperscript{118} According to the Mason Training Report 80% respondents said their communities’ perceptions of masons improved after the training,\textsuperscript{119} though this figure is for both male and female trainees, and includes data from outside the valley districts.

**Increased financial inclusion.** According to BRC and NRCS KIIIs, the livelihoods cash grants helped beneficiaries sign up for banks accounts, thus increasing the financial inclusion of the targeted vulnerable groups. While from the monitoring information it is clear which beneficiaries received the cash grant through a bank transfer, it is not clear which of these beneficiaries did not previously have banks accounts. Therefore the evaluators were unable to determine how large of a contribution this has made.

**Strengthening the local economy.** According to monitoring information for DEC,\textsuperscript{120} the livelihoods cash grants and shelter’s CfW helped to reinforce the local economy through purchasing locally-sourced materials. For instance, livelihoods cash grant beneficiaries reportedly purchased their livestock from neighbouring communities, while agricultural cash grantees hired local non-skilled labour. The small enterprises were credited with increasing the availability of goods in local markets. FGDs noted the local markets were well supplied. The potential multiplier effects of the cash injection on the local economy has however not been calculated.

**Enhanced environmental practices.** Similarly, DEC\textsuperscript{121} monitoring information credits the agricultural technical training with spreading information on more sustainable agricultural practices (e.g. using less pesticides and chemicals), which should have a positive effect on the environment. While KIIIs with district agricultural offices mentioned that trainings helped

\textsuperscript{117} According to a NRCS Monitoring, out of the 930 trained masons, 7.5% (i.e. 68) of which being women.

\textsuperscript{118} BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018 and KIIIs. Women also received an equal wage as men for CfW. “Pre-Recovery Cash for Work and Seeds and Tools Distribution in the Kathmandu Valley - for Decision by ETF,” n.d.

\textsuperscript{119} “Mason Post Training Follow Up Report” (NRCS and BRC, 2017).

\textsuperscript{120} BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2a Final Report (Narrative),” 2017.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
beneficiaries’ practises become more technically sound, they do not specifically mention that these practices were aimed at improving the environment.

The only negative unintended effect of the BRC/NRCS recovery programme the evaluators uncovered was that certain activities initially increased community tensions. As discussed in Section V.1.3, the first round of targeting for the livelihoods cash grants caused consequent dissatisfaction among community members, which increased communication does not seem to have completely removed. Another documented example of community tension was having Dalit work alongside higher castes in CfW, which required community mediation to resolve.¹²²

Although not a direct, negative unintended effect on the targeted population per se, the silo nature of the programme’s design and implementation resulted in a missed opportunity for horizontal learning across sectors to improve programming as a whole. While both documentation¹²³ and NRCS KII provided examples of inter-sectoral collaboration (e.g. factoring in where shelter construction or livestock may increase the demand on water supply in the decision to build water taps), KII agreed that work was generally conducted in sectoral silos.

V.1.5. Situation if programme hadn’t taken place

FGDs and local stakeholders generally agreed that the situation today would be much more critical had the BRC/NRCS programme not provided assistance to these communities. Some noted that it would be more difficult for the communities to meet their basic needs, as others cited various negative coping strategies (e.g. taking out loans and/or reducing meals) the communities would have had to adopt to cope. Local KII were also concerned that without assistance the gap between the well-off and the poor would have increased, as only the former would have been capable to rebuild their lives.

As there were not as many other international humanitarian actors operating in the valley districts (in comparison with other Category A earthquake-affected districts),¹²⁴ and those who were operating in the valley were not doing so at the same scale as the BRC/NRCS

¹²² Ibid.
programme,\textsuperscript{125} it seems likely to the evaluators that many of the communities included in this programme would not have received assistance, and \textit{would have needed to rely more on their own capacity to cope.}

Indeed, KIIs (HQ and DC levels) and FGDs generally agreed that the communities would have started to recover by relying on their own resources and ability, but that \textit{this process would have occurred more slowly}. In particular, FGDs and local stakeholder KIIs thought the removal of debris would have taken significantly longer to complete without external help.

\textbf{V.2. Timeliness of the interventions}

FGDs conducted for this evaluation, as well as for the CHS Review,\textsuperscript{126} generally agreed that \textit{activities occurred in a timely manner}. FGDs for this evaluation noted that \textit{the interventions consistently met their needs over time}, meaning that their needs did not evolve while waiting for the assistance to arrive.

Implementers however noted that the programme faced significant delays and the overall programming timeline (and associated budget) had to be revised at least two to three times.\textsuperscript{127} Even during the first six months, which KIIs with programme implementers found generally followed the planned timeline, specific interventions faced timing issues. The first cash distribution for seeds and tools in December 2015/January 2016 was late,\textsuperscript{128} and some beneficiaries had already started to cultivate their land. Thus, about a fifth of the distributed cash was used for other activities, e.g. paying down debt.\textsuperscript{129}

After the first six months of programming, one of the \textit{major sources of delay was NRCS’ efforts to scale up}. Both BRC and NRCS KIIs reported that it took a few months for NRCS to create the Earthquake Recovery Operation (ERO) structure and hire staff to fill the various Red Cross District Chapter (DC) offices. KIIs generally agreed that hiring, and then conducting

\textsuperscript{125} Information based on NRCS and external KIIs.
\textsuperscript{126} Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS).” As stated in the CHS Review, this finding relates to CHS commitment 2.2.
\textsuperscript{127} According to BRC KIIs. This appears to be confirmed in DEC reporting, which highlights which activities were moved to later phases of the programming.
\textsuperscript{128} Reason why was not specified in “Kathmandu Valley Integrated Urban Recovery Programme Post Distribution Monitoring and Exit Survey Report Cash Grants for Seeds and Tools” (BRC and NRCS, 2016).
training/building the capacity of the new ERO staff, delayed the roll out of activities across sectors.

An example of how the lack of capacity initially caused delays was targeting beneficiaries for the livelihoods cash grant. The lengthy process of handling complaints, redesigning the beneficiary lists and clarifying the selection criteria caused the first cash instalment to occur later than planned.\textsuperscript{130} Of the 86% of calls to the hotline from May-October 2017 in Kathmandu, 16% of them were about the timeliness of receiving the cash grants.\textsuperscript{131}

BRC and NRCS KIIs noted a number of other important sources of delays that affected programming. An important external factor was the slow government pace for key guidance and decisions. Like the ERO, the government also took a few months to set up its structure to coordinate response efforts (NRA), which was a key issue as NRCS was required to have Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the government before implementing programming. In addition, the Government took a few months to formalise guidance for the shelter sector, without which shelter activities could not commence.

Bureaucratic processes and slow decision-making also appear to have plagued the newly-formed ERO structure. Many BRC KIIs, as well as the CHS Review, noted that decision-making was highly formalised and consisted of a heavy authorisation processes. An illustrative example was procurement. The CHS Review highlighted the delays in procuring kiosks, which BRC KIIs attributed to slow decision-making in the ERO. Another issue was that NRCS had to follow the government’s tendering process, so selecting service providers became a lengthy endeavour. This particularly affected the construction of water taps and vocational training.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} According to NRCS feedback, Kathmandu had more resistance to using CTP than the other districts, which helped lead to delays in starting the cash grants. In addition, resolving staffing challenges and the change in district leadership were important elements that got the cash distributions back on track.

\textsuperscript{131} BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018. BRC and NRCS KIIs agreed however that the timeliness improved as NRCS’ capacity to handle CTP improved. The team harnessed the lessons learned during the first instalment and became more efficient in terms of communicating, selecting beneficiaries and resolving complaints.

\textsuperscript{132} Both BRC and NRCS HQ KIIs noted the slow process to contract suppliers delayed the construction of water taps. The introduction of Red Contracts with suppliers however appears to have improved the implementation of water taps, according to BRC and NRCS KIIs. According to BRC KIIs, this slow tendering process led to the decision to provide beneficiaries with cash grants for vocational training to allow them to choose which institute to attend, as NRCS was taking too long to contract training institutes.
**BRC bureaucracy** was also a noted source of delay. NRCS and BRC KIIIs highlighted that BRC had its own accountability processes related to dispersing funds, which could take up to a month. According to one NRCS KII, NRCS had to take a loan from its HQ to fund the DCs while waiting for BRC funding to arrive. Some BRC KIIIs also noted that BRC had a heavy sign-off process and an internal way of working between HQ and country office, which could be slow if the correct people were not available or if in-country staff were not familiar enough with the system.

BRC however demonstrated capacity to mitigate some of the delays to continue to move forward with certain activities. According to one BRC KII, BRC used more volunteers in the beginning to account for the lack of NRCS staff, and focused on activities that were feasible (e.g. CfW) while delaying others that required government approval and procurement (e.g. construction of water taps).

Beyond this particular recovery response, the Mid-term review of PNS’ recovery programmes found that it took more than 18 months to truly get activities going. Furthermore, nearly all DEC members in Nepal faced similar delays to their timelines. While it seems reasonable that the same external factors would affect all humanitarian organisations in the country (e.g. the government’s slow processes for providing guidance and approval), it appears that other international humanitarian organisations also had issues with their implementing partners’ initial capacity and suppliers, suggesting that some of these issues are more specific to the context and lack of on-the-ground humanitarian capacity than to the Red Cross.

**VI. Value for Money of the Operational Model**

Value for Money (VfM) can be defined as the 3 E’s framework of economy, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. It refers to the optimal use of resources to achieve the best outcomes.

Economy measures cost saving, while efficiency focuses on how well inputs are converted into outputs. Efficiency gains can come from choosing less resource-intensive ways of working and from decreases in direct costs, such as removing duplicate positions. Measuring cost-effectiveness analyses the relative costs of achieving the desired results, which in the case of this evaluation will focus on reviewing what has been achieved due to the partnership that

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133 This has not been corroborated by other sources.
could not have happened if NRCS operated alone (i.e. whether the added value of BRC justified the cost of the partnership).

The sections below examine, in a qualitative way, the VfM of the operational model (i.e. the BRC/NRCS partnership) to identify where this partnership added value to the recovery programme.

VI.1. Economy and Efficiency

When only looking at DEC funding, the total budget for the recovery phase was 5,006,601 GBP. DEC funding accounted for 67% of the funds BRC allocated to NRCS.

Out of its five million GBP DEC budget, 80% (4,109,170 GBP) was allocated to the intervention’s various sectors. 90% of sectoral funding was allocated to shelter (51%) and livelihoods (39%), as can be seen in the graph below.

Graph 3: DEC Funds Per Sector

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135 Given the structure of the DEC budgets (e.g. lack of budget breakdown) it is not feasible to determine the management and operational costs for DEC funds only.

136 Based on Phase 2a’s total expenditure of 3,537,170 GBP. BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 3 - Phase 12a 2b - Finance,” 2017 and Phase 2b’s planned total expenditure of 1,469,431 GBP. Final budget information for Phase 2b was not available at the time of data collection, but BRC KIIs said they were on track to spend the allotted DEC financing in time. BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 3 - Phase 2b 6 Month Report,” 2017. The planned 2b budget is used for the rest of the VfM section.

In general, the longer a partnership has existed, the more efficient it becomes (e.g. it takes fewer resources to align work, personal relationships can improve communication, etc.). Given the long-standing institutional partnership between BRC and NRCS, it seems likely that the operational model has benefitted from these efficiency gains. While the Mid-term review noted that "the concept of partnership, joint responsibility and co-management...has not materialised as anticipated, resulting in a deterioration in the levels of mutual trust and openness between NRCS and its partners," this does not appear to be the case between BRC and NRCS, as KIIs from both organisations highlighted generally being satisfied with the ways of working and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities (as codified in the project agreements). Indeed, while the Mid-term review noted communication issues between PNS and NRCS, BRC and NRCS HQ KIIs touted their strong working relationship and ability to sit down and resolve issues when needed.

The evaluation however only found a few examples of cost savings between BRC and NRCS that improved the programme’s efficiency. One was sharing vehicles when visiting the field, and the second was using BRC staff to conduct various ICB trainings rather than external facilitators (both based on BRC KIIs). Lastly, BRC’s decision to rely on NRCS’ expertise in shelter and health, rather than hiring additional delegates, can also be seen as an example of cost savings that enhanced the efficiency of the model.

VI.2. Cost-effectiveness

VI.2.1. BRC support, NRCS increased capacity and enhanced programming effectiveness

Overall, in the evaluators’ opinion BRC provided adequate support for the recovery programme. Indeed, interviewees highlighted BRC support as a major added value of the partnership.

While assisting with recovery is within the remits of both organisations’ mandates, and BRC and NRCS had been working together on the DFID-funded four-year Earthquake Preparedness

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for Safer Communities (EPS) programme in the Kathmandu valley prior to the spring of 2015, the necessary scale of the recovery programme exceeded the capacity and experience of NRCS and BRC in Nepal at the beginning of the programme. One NRCS KII noted that their contingency plans (which the government also used) had been based on the scale of the 1934 earthquake, which had been the largest one in the past 80 years. However, the 2015 earthquake’s scale were significantly larger, thus reducing the usefulness of these contingency plans. Another NRCS KII highlighted that some of the preparedness efforts under the EPS programme were not done to the scale needed. Furthermore, NRCS KIIs noted they had little previous experience conducting WaSH programming at this scale in the urban context, and thus did not have the contextualised guidance in place for the context-specific risks that would have to be considered. As Section IV.2.1 discussed, this issue was relevant to many sectors whose tools were not initially adapted to the urban context.

As mentioned in Section V.2, NRCS had to rapidly scale up its human resources in order to meet the needs of simultaneously operating across multiple districts in four sectors, as well as to organise the various PNS. The added value of BRC’s scale up was that they were able to fill in NRCS capacity gaps, especially during the initial stages when NRCS was understaffed. In addition to utilising surge support, BRC brought in livelihoods and WaSH delegates and relied on the BRC team based in the UK for further technical support. BRC technical support helped expedite the process of developing programming, as well as monitoring and reporting.\(^{140}\) This allowed BRC/NRCS to move programming forward, e.g. providing winterisation cash grants\(^ {141}\) and conducting the needs assessment.\(^ {142}\)

Once NRCS filled the necessary ERO positions, BRC aimed to fill the significant capacity and asset\(^ {143}\) building needs in order to conduct an effective recovery programme. BRC team members worked with their counterparts to provide technical and management support across

BRC and NRCS have the strategic aim to strengthen recovery, with BRC’s document specifying that they focus on helping vulnerable people respond to emergencies.

\(^{140}\) According to BRC feedback, the BRC UK PMEAL Advisor worked with the NRCS and IFRC PMER teams to develop the One Movement Plan, and the needs assessment approach and plan. BRC delegates for all sectors (WASH, Livelihoods, Shelter, Health, PMEAL/CEA/IT) engaged in recovery-focused technical working groups to help strengthen overall coordination and approaches. From NRCS feedback, having the same PM from the start was a huge asset, in terms of the depth of his/her historical knowledge and access to many different documented sources.


\(^{142}\) One BRC KII noted they brought in an external consultant to help lead the MSA.

\(^{143}\) Asset building in terms of in-kind support provided to district chapters to enhance their capacity to deliver programming falls under Appeal funding.
the areas of intervention. BRC’s main forms of support included providing trainings, mentoring, review/feedback, and formalised guidance.

Across the specific areas that BRC provided support, KIIIs generally agreed that NRCS’ capacity improved. BRC KIIIs noted they were now monitoring the NRCS counterparts less frequently, which tends to indicate that NRCS staff are able to handle programming more independently while maintaining a sufficient level of quality. The table below provides an overview of 1) examples of BRC support collected for this evaluation, 2) the capacity building KIIIs attributed to this support (at both HQ and DC levels), and 3) any increase in programme effectiveness that KIIIs see as a result of this increased capacity.
### Table 3: BRC support to NRCS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Support BRC provided</th>
<th>Attributed improved capacity at NRCS HQ and DC levels (as per KIIs)</th>
<th>Attributed increase in programme effectiveness (as per KIIs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>• Training (e.g. how to handle hotline feedback)</td>
<td>• Better communication with beneficiaries, as indicated by receiving fewer complaints (DC levels).</td>
<td>• Contributed to making the second round of livelihoods cash grants occur more quickly and smoothly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Introduced new techniques, e.g. hotline and SMS</td>
<td>• Ability to handle feedback (e.g. hotline calls, holding community meetings) without asking for BRC assistance (DC and HQ levels).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Joint management of activities (scheduling, follow-up)</td>
<td>• Organisation cultural shift - increased ownership of CEA, seen as a leader in CEA across RCM (HQ level).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Based on KIIs and BRC and NRCS (HQ and field level), and BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2a Final Report (Narrative),” 2017. The full list of trainings for NRCS staff and volunteers included: PASSA, community-based health, psycho-social support, hygiene promotion, enterprise development, anti-fraud and corruption prevention, Core Humanitarian Standards, community mobilization and RAMP surveys.
| CTP | • Training  
• Mentoring/constant contact, joint management of implementation (including targeting/selection criteria, cash distribution process, etc.)  
• Guidance on coordinating with government entities, banks and insurance companies  
• Quality check field data  
• Written step-by-step guidance (SoP Cash Transfers) | • NRCS DCs generally managing and implementing cash distribution, HQ handling monitoring.\(^{145}\)  
• NRCS leading collaboration with banks and insurance schemes (DC level).  
• Increased acceptance of cash, “champions” in NRCS (HQ level).  
• Increased confidence in selecting beneficiaries (DC level). | • Contributed to making the second round of livelihoods cash grants occur more quickly and smoothly |
| --- | --- | --- |
| WaSH | • Training (for WaSH in the urban context)  
• Review WaSH engineers’ design and estimate drawings  
• Field visits to determine what is realistic/feasible | • NRCS WaSH engineers’ designs and estimates have fewer mistakes, better output analysis (DC and HQ levels). | • Unclear if it directly affected programming effectiveness, or rather reduced the workload on BRC staff to check NRCS’ work |

\(^{145}\) From NRCS feedback, successfully moving from Red Card to community-agree vulnerability targeting, and managing the caseload of over 13,000 cash grant beneficiaries were major achievements for NRCS. It is notable that the BRC/NRCS programme reached a large number of beneficiaries than other PNS that used cash grants for livelihoods.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Shelter  | - Jointly developed concept note  
           - Jointly created a 40 hour carpenter training package out of the government’s 390 hour version  
           - Trained PASSA trainers  
           - No examples provided. AS BRC did not have delegate for shelter, it is reasonable that their support in this area were less focused on NRCS capacity building.  
           - NA |
| Monitoring| - Training  
           - Introduced new techniques for qualitative monitoring, e.g. MSC  
           - HQ and DC level log frames clearer, better quality of monitoring tools and reports.  
           - More comfortable using qualitative data collection methods (DC and HQ levels).  
           - Fostered organisation cultural change – more focus on learning and willing to  
           - None provided |

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146 The same applies to health. While this evaluation did not collect any examples of BRC providing support to NRCS specifically in the health sector, this may be because the evaluators did not interview any implementers (in BRC or NRCS) solely focused on health.

147 Including co-facilitation support for trainings on PMER/M&E, case study writing, data analysis, information management according to feedback from NRCS.
| Finance and programme management | • Training (anti-fraud and anti-corruption, financial planning)  
• Jointly review DC budget estimates with HQ  
• Cross check and ensure following minimum requirements for financial compliance  
• Monthly visits to DCs for check accounting transactions and on-site mentoring  
• Support (training/mentoring) on logistics management, reporting, project management | • Fewer mistakes in financial forecasting, budgets and expenditures (DC and HQ levels).  
• Added columns for budget breakdown per district, prepare monthly budget breakdown (HQ level).  
• Organisation culture change – increased participation of management and programme team in budget process (HQ level).  
• DCs noted by local stakeholder KII to have increased capacity to plan, monitor and implement activities, and improved communication. | • DC-level programming better planned, monitored and implemented. |
| Identify and manage risks | • BRC take the lead in updating risk registers, solely handled risks at management level | • Has become more habitual (at HQ level). | • None provided |
| ICB | • BRC conducted Branch Capacity Assessments workshops in all districts in January 2016 to identify the current capacity, as well as their gaps and needs.\textsuperscript{148} | • Further ICB activities (e.g. toilet construction and carpet refurbishing in DC offices etc.) however were conducted with Appeal funding. | • NA |

\textsuperscript{148} BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 11 Phase 2 BRC 6 Month Narrative Report,” 2016.
While KIIIs were able to cite positive examples of capacity improvements, and in some cases directly attribute them programming’s enhanced effectiveness, it is unlikely that these changes are solely due to the support BRC provided. At the HQ level, the NRCS team also worked with multiple other PNS, which likely also helped to professionalise their practices and increase their capacity. Similarly, other changes that occurred during the course of the programme, such as introducing software to automatize the WaSH engineer’s designs, financial reporting, and the MIS system for monitoring, also appear to have helped improve capacity (and thus potentially also programming), but cannot be attributed to BRC.

In addition, it is not feasible to determine to what extent the training and mentoring BRC provided versus the “learning by doing” method increased capacity: any programme that occurs over the course of a few years would be expected to improve based on lessons learned along the way. BRC’s support and mentoring appears to have fostered champions of CEA, CTP, and qualitative monitoring in NRCS, which are key factors for creating the organisational changes that appear to have started.

Lastly, as NRCS’ capacity to deliver programming at this scale was originally quite low, the fact that they have now improved does not mean that the level is now sufficient. BRC KIIIs stressed that more effort is needed to build upon these positive initial steps, as well as to fill in areas still highlighted as gaps, to ensure learning is embedded to improve future programming. Remaining gaps KIIIs highlighted as detailed below.

**Targeting:** While some interviewees demonstrated that they understood the rationale for using vulnerability criteria (particularly at the HQ level), a number of DC-level KIIIs still favoured blanket approaches, which suggests that vulnerability-based targeting is still not fully embedded.

**Monitoring:** During the course of the programme KIIIs admitted there has been more focus on collecting data than analysing it (as data collection was a lengthy process that did not then leave sufficient time to analyse all the collected data). While the MIS system (which the American Red Cross helped establish) provides an opportunity to increase data analysis by automatizing and simplifying the process, its introduction occurred too late into the BRC/NRCS recovery programme to have a significant effect. The inability/lack of opportunity to systematically analyse programme data is a missed opportunity to provide evidence to support
decision-making at the management level.\textsuperscript{149} As a result, BRC KIIls conceded that the increase in NRCS capacity for monitoring has not yet lead to more informed programme related decisions for this specific recovery programme.

**Finance:** The timing of the financial reporting remained problematic. According to BRC KIIls, NRCS’s expenditure reporting was always late. While NRCS HQ attributed this to the fact that DCs are still doing financial reporting manually, the Lalitpur DC supposedly uses the software.

**Risks:** According to one BRC KII, identifying and managing risks appears to have become more habitual, but still occurs in sectoral silos. Indeed, NRCS-prepared risk assessment matrixes\textsuperscript{150} are solely sector specific and vary in terms of comprehensiveness (with the livelihoods being the most comprehensive, while the WaSH matrix lacked mitigating efforts and/or likelihood ranking or only including generic risks). The BRC KI noted that further support is still needed for risk management to become fully embedded in NRCS.\textsuperscript{151} In addition, handling risks at the management level represents an area where BRC efforts surpassed purely providing support, as they assumed most of it.\textsuperscript{152} According to the BRC KII, this was due to the lack of an overall operational manager for the ERO HQ level.

**VI.2.2. Coordination with external actors**

**VI.2.2.1. Coordination within RCM**

As highlighted in other reviews,\textsuperscript{153} coordination among PNS was not fully maximised during recovery. BRC, along with the other PNS, missed opportunities to further strengthen

\textsuperscript{149} This finding is confirmed in the CHS Review, which noted that the programme did not have systems that ensured “systematic monitoring and adaption of the programme.” Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS)” p. 8.” This is related to CHS Commitment 2.5.


\textsuperscript{151} For this programme BRC tracked programme risks, which were reported to and discussed at the Major Programming Board in the UK (according to BRC KIIls).

\textsuperscript{152} This also likely ensured the quality of risk management was satisfactory, as confirmed by the internal audit (according to BRC KII as the report has not been shared) and that the BRC UK Programming Board was satisfied with how the programme handled risks.

coordination at the project management level (not just sectoral) and harness horizontal learning. Examples of missed opportunities KIIIs highlighted included not using the annual/semi-annual review meeting for more learning purposes (rather than each PNS reporting on its progress), not jointly advocating to NRCS to improve procurement, and not doing organisational strengthening across NRCS in a more systematic fashion, e.g. building on progress already completed using the Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification Tool.

This issue is not unique to BRC, who nonetheless demonstrated some positive examples of coordination. IFRC and other PNS KIIIs noted that BRC was active in sectoral coordination meetings, contributing to work on developing standards, training curriculums etc. BRC’s technical and financial support to DRC for winterisation cash grants\(^{154}\) is also a positive example of effective collaboration. In fact, one PNS KII credited BRC sharing its lessons from doing cash grants with helping other PNS get their cash programmes running more quickly. Other examples\(^{155}\) of BRC’s efforts to coordinate include using its HQ’s PMEAL officer to help design the One Movement Plan,\(^{156}\) being a part of the steering committee for the Mid-term Evaluation, sharing the learning from its CHS Review, and providing “shared leadership” for CEA (e.g. providing support to both NRCS and other PNS).

**VI.2.2.2. Non-RCM coordination**

One example of BRC’s added value was its ability to coordinate with other humanitarian actors beyond the RCM. A notable example was BRC’s coordination with Oxfam. Early on in the recovery phase the organisations ensured that their activities did not overlap in the Kathmandu Valley by creating a mapping of all wards where they were providing assistance and conducting monthly/bi-monthly meetings (as well as regular email correspondence).\(^{157}\) The two organisations also shared information on their cash distribution processes, as well as the challenges they faced and lessons learned.

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\(^{155}\) According to BRC feedback.

\(^{156}\) This was meant to help collaboration as well as ensure the appropriate standards.

BRC’s efforts to prevent overlap in general appear to have been successful, as FGDs and local stakeholder KIIs that BRC/NRCS programming did not overlap with other actors when they were present in the area.

According to other DEC members, BRC was an active member in the DEC meetings, and even took the lead for the field level learning in Bhaktapur at the Collaborative Learning Initiative.\textsuperscript{158} By being an active member in discussions around government policy changes and challenges faced, it is likely these meetings fostered learning that may have indirectly helped improve the BRC/NRCS programme.

Another example of BRC’s added value in terms of external coordination was that they introduced NRCS to the Cash Coordination Group, that NRCS did not attend prior to this programme. One external KII noted that NRCS is now an active member of the Cash Coordination Group and even served as the coordination lead for two months.\textsuperscript{159}

Lastly, while efforts to engage local stakeholders were conducted jointly and/or led by NRCS staff in the field, BRC appears to have added value in working with private actors. KIIs credited BRC’s support to NRCS’ advocacy with the banks and insurance schemes as contributing to their agreeing to establish temporary branches for the livelihoods cash grants distributions and insuring beneficiaries.

\textbf{VII. Sustainability of the programme-induced changes}

\textbf{VII.1. Community level sustainability}

According to KIIs, the programme begin to create its transition plans only after this issue was highlighted in the Mid-term review. At the time of data collection for this evaluation, these plans were still being formulated\textsuperscript{160} and thus the evaluators were unable to review them. In general however, the programme aims to hand over responsibility for ongoing activities to volunteers, the relevant user committees or government departments. Thus, the capacity of

\textsuperscript{158} DEC KIIs, BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2b 6 Month Report (Narrative),” 2018.
\textsuperscript{159} The leadership of the Cash Coordination Group rotates between member organisations.
\textsuperscript{160} Based on the “Transitional Plan for IFRC Country Office, March 2018” (IFRC, n.d.). While DEC-funded activities conclude in April 2018, Appeal-funded activities will continue for another year.
these entities to continue activities on their own is an essential element for the sustainability of this intervention.

**VII.1.1. Volunteers**

While beneficiaries generally reported feeling confident in their ability to continue using the soft skills learned through this programme (e.g. from hygiene, WaSH and shelter messaging), it is likely that volunteers (including FCHVs) will need to hold refresher trainings.\(^\text{161}\) Although the CHS Review found the volunteers possessed "great enthusiasm and commitment,"\(^\text{162}\) their continued commitment once the programme ends is questionable. The *retention of trained volunteers will therefore be pivotal to the programme's sustainability*. While the IFRC’s transition plan\(^\text{163}\) suggests to create a database of trained volunteers who could be mobilised as needed and to follow up with newly registered volunteers to keep them engaged, these efforts may not be sufficient, nor is clear from where the funding for maintaining engagement with volunteers will come.

**VII.1.2. User Committees**

BRC and NRCS KII confirm that WUCs have received training on how to do maintenance/repairs on water taps and water quality testing. According to FGDs,\(^\text{164}\) **WUCs generally feel confident in their technical capacity. They are however more concerned about securing the appropriate financing to maintain infrastructures.** One FGD did note they were collecting funds for repairs, but others FGD\(^\text{165}\) noted they had not appointed a caretaker due to a lack of funds.

**School committees according to KII are prepared to assume responsibility for hygiene messaging.** Based on one KII this appears to however be a combined result of another humanitarian organisation’s programming with the school, as they have signed a MoU where

\(^{161}\) BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2a Final Report (Narrative),” 2017 noted needing refresher trainings for first aid and health messaging.

\(^{162}\) Boughen et. al, “Analysis of the Nepal Earthquake Recovery Programme (Kathmandu Valley) against the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS).” As stated in the CHS Review, this finding relates to CHS commitment 8.


\(^{164}\) For this evaluation and the “Focus Group Discussion on WASH Earthquake Recovery Programme in Kathmandu Valley,” 2017.

\(^{165}\) Ibid.
the school committed to saving 100,000 NPR a year (which would cover the costs of future trainings).

As part of the livelihoods sector, the programme provided training to cooperatives and women’s groups to increase their skills and knowledge of finance, enterprise development and management. However, according to a NRCS KII even after these trainings their capacities vary, so their ability to sustain programming appears uncertain.

**VII.1.3. Government Departments**

Another key element for the sustainability of the livelihoods interventions were the linkages the programme developed between cash grant recipients and the local District Agricultural or Livestock Offices, who provided the technical training. According to BRC, NRCS and local stakeholder KII, this has helped to increase the communities’ awareness of where to go for additional support (i.e. to access the government’s insurance scheme for livestock or for further technical training). The main risk however is the government restructuring, as these services will move to the municipality level. As such, if not addressed during the transition phase these linkages may be lost.

A concern for the programme’s sustainability across sectors are the expectations of both communities and user committees of the assistance the government will provide. KII with various local actors (WUCs, disabled centres etc.) have noted they will need, or even expect, further funding for the continuation of activities. FGDs have mentioned that they expect further follow up trainings for livelihood activities and masons, and more health camps. If it is no longer feasible to receive this assistance through the Red Cross (or volunteers), these groups expect the relevant local government departments to provide the needed assistance.

While some local departments appear prepared to take over activities (such as the District Public Health Office for health posts and psycho-social counselling), most line ministries and ward representatives do not yet have plans for financing the continuation of these activities. Some line ministry KII noted that responsibility would solely rest with the user committees (e.g. WUCs for the water taps). FGDs highlighted that community members do not have confidence in their ability to get assistance from local governments. FGDs noted they would have to

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166 Confirmed by BRC and NRCS KII. This activity is planned for in BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 13 - Phase 2b - Output Table BRC,” 2018 but does not appear to have been completed before the 6 months DEC report, as according to the BRC KII this activity occurred over the past few months.
advocate for assistance as a group, as based on previous experience the local governments do not respond to individual requests.

As BRC/NRCS finalise their transition plans, these potential threats will need to be addressed to ensure the positive changes the programme fostered are not lost.

**VII.2. NRCS level sustainability**

NRCS staff at both the HQ and DC levels noted that based on their improved capacity (as detailed in Section VI.2), they felt confident in their technical and management abilities to continue to implement and monitor the programme’s activities without further BRC support. KIIs noted there were additional trainings planned to continue to build NRCS’ capacity, such as the CTP advanced level training in June that will be conducted with BRC support.¹⁶⁷

NRCS KIIs also noted that they now have documented sectoral guidance (e.g. SoP on cash transfers and Roadmap for WaSH) with step-by-step assistance to conduct future programming. The main threat that these KIIs highlighted was financing. NRCS will need to fund raise either within PNS or directly with donors to implement similar activities in the future.

Another potential threat to the sustainability of NRCS’ enhanced capacity is how NRCS will handle the ERO’s transition. As this programme only worked with specific ERO staff, the increased technical and management skills built during this programme appear to still be at the individual, rather than institutional level.¹⁶⁸ As recovery programmes end and NRCS’ staff reduces, it is unclear how many of the trained ERO staff will be retained and reintegrated into NRCS departments.

**VIII. Conclusions**

Especially considering the contextual and operational challenges, the programme appears to have achieved significant progress towards helping targeted communities recover. Despite some delays and slow progress in changing NRCS’ usual ways of working, local stakeholders and beneficiaries (including representatives of various vulnerable groups) generally agreed that

¹⁶⁷ Training is outside the scope of the DEC-funded activities.
¹⁶⁸ At the time of this evaluation report BRC was planning on undertaking further research/learning reviews on cash programming and CEA. The CEA learning review will inform the development of a CEA strategy that will then be institutionalised.
the programme responded to their needs and has helped to improve their situation across the four sectors. As one of the largest recovery efforts in the Kathmandu Valley, BRC/NRCS were essential actors in the region’s recovery.

The strong BRC/NRCS partnership appears to have been a contributing factor to the programme’s success. While the partnership may not have contributed to significant economy and efficiency gains, BRC’s main added value was building NRCS’ capacity, which appears to have directly supported increases in programming effectiveness. In looking at the various ways BRC contributed to the programme, it appears to have provided good cost-effectiveness. In the evaluators’ opinion, it is unlikely that the recovery programme could have achieved the same results with less BRC support, especially given that previous preparedness activities were insufficient for the scale of damage the 2015 earthquakes caused.

Going forward, BRC and NRCS appear well positioned to continue to jointly implement interventions as needed. Based on the experience and knowledge gained from this programme, it is likely that implementers will be able to conduct activities more quickly and more efficiently. However, as NRCS capacity building largely rests at the individual level, the uncertainty of staff retention as the ERO reintegrates back into NRCS departments poses a significant threat to the sustainability of this programme’s achievements. Similarly, without further financing, both the retention of staff’s new skillsets, as well as progress achieved among the communities, appears questionable.

The key challenge ahead lies with the institutionalisation of those learnings so as to improve preparedness to potential future disasters. To help improve potential future interventions, the section below discusses areas of the programme that could be further improved.

IX. Recommendations

The recommendations below primarily target future BRC/NRCS programming, and secondarily any relevant remaining activities under the Appeal funding for this recovery programme.

IX.1. Situation analysis

Recommendation: Ensure a timely comprehensive desegregated situation analysis that will systematically feed into response design (for BRC and NRCS).
• Conduct the MSA and RoA (including comprehensively consulting communities and local stakeholders) at the start of the programme.
• Not only consult the different groups but also capture their needs in a desegregated manner so that it could inform tailored activities. Determining how different groups’ needs differ is an integral element of the MSA. It is particularly important in urban contexts where communities are not homogenous, and as such blanket coverage may not equally cover the varying levels of need among different community members.

IX.2. Response analysis

Recommendation: Envision multi-sectoral intervention as a single approach as opposed to parallel sectoral activities (for BRC and NRCS).

• Apprehend multi-sectoral interventions as a way to maximise impact rather than a strict framework where each sector should be addressed through activities spreading themselves too thin. This could mean considering focusing on fewer outputs/activities per sector.
• Encourage efforts for multi-sectoral planning through conducting the RoA jointly. That would ensure cross sectoral linkages are identified from the beginning of the programme.
• Consider joint risk identification and management and implement joint monitoring.
• Share challenges and lessons learned and foster inter-sectoral linkages in a more institutional way (rather than the ad hoc manner in which it seems to have occurred).

Recommendation: ensure that programming is inclusive of all the different groups (for BRC and NRCS).

• Determining the different types and level of need across different groups can help clarify who requires what type of assistance per sector. This information in turn can inform not only which activities are the most appropriate (during the RoA), but also the selection criteria to help ensure that the correct people are targeted for assistance.
• Consider providing UCGs directly to beneficiaries who are unable to undertake income generating activities themselves. This appears to be feasible in the context as another PNS used it in its recovery programme. As this report highlighted some activities left out the most vulnerable groups (e.g. Seeds and Tools for those who don’t own land). While the livelihoods cash grants aimed to focus on vulnerable communities, providing
assistance to populations unable to work (PLWDs, elderly) relied on targeting family members who were eligible to work and could meet the condition for the cash grants.

IX.3. Implementation

Recommendation: Draw clear targeting criteria and methodologies from the situation analysis and make sure it is communicated clearly and transparently across recipients and non-recipients (for BRC and NRCS, communication specifically for NRCS).

- Use the MSA to further nuance the traditional ‘vulnerable’ groups (e.g. women, elderly, PLWD, Dalit, Janajati, etc.). As the Livelihoods Assessment notes, socio-economic factors may be equally important determinates of what makes a person “vulnerable.”
- Consider blanket targeting not as the go to option but only for specific activities such as messaging.
- Ensure committees charged with selecting beneficiaries have proper representation. To balance the benefits of community involvement in selecting the beneficiaries (as they have better knowledge of the context and community members) with the potential threat of bias, programme implementers should ensure inclusion of women and other vulnerable groups in the selection committees (i.e. that they not dominated by men). In addition, the practice of using two selection committees and comparing their beneficiary lists should be systematically applied across all communities as a method to reduce the risk of bias in beneficiary selection.
- Continue the efforts for comprehensive CEA/local stakeholder communication and implement those from the beginning of any programme: ensure that the programme’s elements/activities, targeting criteria, and timeline are clear from the beginning so potential beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) know what to expect. Comprehensive and clear beneficiary communication can help prevent increasing community tensions and manage the communities’ expectations about the type and amount of support they will receive.
- When the list of criteria is finalised, ensure it is well circulated and communicated throughout the community, even before beneficiary selection is conducted. It is also

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169 BRC Nepal, “Disaster Response Phase 2a Final Report (Narrative),” 2017 notes that it would have been more effective to use “more specific criteria and incremental targeting of vulnerable groups.”

170 “Livelihoods Recovery Assessment, Kathmandu Valley” (NRCS and BRC, 2016).
important to clarify if certain criteria are more important than others (e.g. if there is a “core” set of criteria that must first be met before considering “other” criteria).

**Recommendation: Strengthen operational processes (for NRCS).**

To ensure smooth implementation of future response, NRCS should continue to strengthen its supply and finance processes.

- NRCS could develop standing agreements with service providers (e.g. banks, insurance schemes) and suppliers (for infrastructure projects) that could be activated in the event of another natural disaster. Handling the tendering and contracting before programming begins would help prevent delays and allow various activities to begin more quickly.
- Update existing manuals and policies to reflect the potential scale of future responses and the use of new modalities (i.e. CTP).

**IX.4. Monitoring**

**Recommendation: make sure monitoring allows for determining whether the response is reaching its target and is used to make programmatic decisions (for BRC and NRCS).**

- NRCS should embed and scale up its MIS system to ensure it has a robust and systematised way to collect and analyse data on the programme’s reach to the targeted vulnerable groups. BRC and NRCS KIIs have already identified the opportunity using MIS presents to reduce the time collecting and disaggregating data, which can instead be used for data analysis. Taking advantages of the MIS System, NRCS should consider systematically disaggregating data as per gender, cast and other vulnerability criteria. Analysing this kind of data can support informed decision-making to improve the programme while it is still being implemented. For instance, this could be used to ensure the programme is reaching the right beneficiaries, and allow implementers to alter their programming as needed.
- Conduct end-line and/or follow-up monitoring in a timely fashion. Multiple local KIIs requested more monitoring throughout project, and in particular to do so after conducting trainings. Conducting timely monitoring (and follow-up) is an important element for capturing learning.

**Recommendation: Set targets for outcome indicators (for BRC and NRCS).**
• Having targets will help the PMEAL team quantitatively determine whether outcomes are being achieved. Determining the percentage of HHs that improved in an area, without having a comparison point of what the programme wanted to achieve, renders it difficult to determine whether the improvement is sufficient.

IX.1. Sustainability

Recommendation: programme implementers should make sure to foster the appropriate linkages between community, committees and local government entities, and also ensure the roles and responsibilities of each are understood (for NRCS).

• This should be embedded in any response design but has a particular emphasis during the transition and exit phase. Specifically, during the transition volunteers and programme implementers should keep the community abreast of how the government’s restructuring affects where they need to go for further information or support. Before activities under the Appeal fund ends, communities should for instance be aware of how to contact the municipality offices for livestock and agriculture, or where to go for psycho-social support or further information on PASSA.

• In addition, clarifying each actor’s role and responsibility after the BRC/NRCS programme ends will help to ensure the programme has not created unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved. WUCs and the District Department for Water Supply and Sewage for instance should be in agreement as to the latter’s responsibility to support the WUC, either financially or otherwise. BRC will also need to communicate with the programme’s local stakeholders (e.g. district line ministries, ward secretaries, user committees, etc.) that its support for recovery programming is ending, as some local stakeholders have noted that they expect further BRC support for other recovery activities such as housing construction.

Recommendation: Consider the retention of staff and volunteers as a key factor for sustainability (for BRC and NRCS).

• Having been part of the ERO should be an important criteria for being selected as part of future programme team.

• Future NRCS and potential BRC programmes could also use the same community volunteers to keep them engaged in RCM interventions. Working with the trained volunteers will also help to maintain their capacity in transferable areas, such as CEA.
Recommendation: Ensure guidance developed during this programme is documented to help foster institutional memory (for BRC and NRCS).

- Ensure that guidance for all activities (not just cash grants and the WaSH Road Map) is properly documented and shared with NRCS departments after the ERO structure is closed. In particular, lessons about how to tailor specific activities (PASSA, CfW, WaSH infrastructure, etc.) to the urban context and what risks need to be considered should be consolidated and documented to assist future urban programming.

IX.2. CTP

Recommendation: further encourage NRCS to be at the forefront of CTP in country (for BRC).

- Consider/help advocate to NRCS to systematically consider the use of CTP across sectors, beyond livelihood and NFI and in a non-immediate relief phase. This is already on its way, but efforts should be continued.
- Continue what is currently being done to support ERO staff who were trained in conducting CTP once they’ve been reintegrated into NRCS to ensure they remain “champions” of CTP. Supporting these advocates can help to keep CTP at the front of NRCS’ mind when considering modalities to use for programming and maintain interest in it going forward.
- Empower NRCS to take a leadership role in cash advocacy and coordination. Introducing NRCS to the Cash Coordination Group was a good initial step towards integrating NRCS into the larger cash network in Nepal. As NRCS’ capacity in CTP and involvement in coordination continues to strengthen, it could be well positioned to also take on a more leading role in coordinating CTP in the aftermath of a future disaster.
- Disseminate Cash related SOP and guidance with the broader humanitarian community in country. As noted in a recent ODI article, the earthquake response presented an opportunity for various international humanitarian organisations to implement CTP activities in Nepal, which has previously had little experience with CTP when compared to other contexts. The study highlights remaining challenges to increasing the uptake of CTP in the country, and offers recommendations for the Cash Coordination Group to move the conversation forward, including developing operational guidelines and

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policy guidance. Sharing the existing ones with NRCS could be a good way to contribute to NRCS leadership role on cash coordination.

- Document the evidence around the use of cash. A number of local stakeholder KII s and FGDs were still concerned cash grants, if used, would be spent for anti-social purposes. However, the fact that over 99% of cash beneficiaries have started livelihood activities based on activity plan and received the second instalment means the vast majority used the grant for its intended purpose. This type of information should be better documented and disseminated in the community to help alleviate fears that cash will used for the wrong purposes and to help increase its acceptance.

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## X. Annex: Targeting Criteria

### Table 4: Targeting per intervention\(^{173}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Targeting criteria</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>PASSA</td>
<td>Blanket approach(^{174})</td>
<td>Individuals (trainers) HHs (participants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training masons, carpenters</td>
<td>Masons: previous experience in construction, resident of the ward, masonry is the main source of income, 18-60 years old, not received other training, commit to rebuild community for next two years</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winterisation UCG</td>
<td>Focus on vulnerable groups (women and children)(^{175})</td>
<td>HHs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CfW</td>
<td>House is uninhabitable, family replaced / living in temporary shelter, debris not cleared from property</td>
<td>HHs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>Seeds and Tools cash grant</td>
<td>Red Card system + vulnerability criteria</td>
<td>HHs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{174}\) From an NRCS KII and BRC Nepal, “PASSA Discussion - Kathmandu Valley,” n.d., it appears the programme wanted to prioritise HHs that (were or about to) constructing their homes, and/or HHs that had a family member involved in construction. This however appears to not have been feasible, as it was uncertain when HHs would receive the government grant and the intended family members were not always available. A different district level KII noted the targeting criteria gave priority to: female, Dalit, senior people, and single women, but this is not confirmed by any other source.

\(^{175}\) According to BRC Nepal, “DEC Form 7 Phase 2a Narrative Plan British Red Cross,” 2015, targeting was meant to include: HHs headed by single women or elderly, families over 5 members, children under 5 years old, families with pregnant or lactating women, PLWD in family, Dalit, Janajatis, family below poverty line, family without economically active member, family with debt in excess of income, however the evaluators were unable to confirm if these criteria were indeed used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihoods</th>
<th>CCGs targeting criteria</th>
<th>HHs</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Individuals (volunteers)</th>
<th>Schools and PLWD centres</th>
<th>Blanket approach</th>
<th>Blanket + emphasis on women and children (schools)</th>
<th>Blanket + emphasis on women (pregnant and lactating) and children</th>
<th>Blanket approach</th>
<th>Table 5: Livelihoods CCGs targeting criteria&lt;sup&gt;176&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income generating CCG + technical support</td>
<td>Ranking exercise based on vulnerability criteria</td>
<td>HHs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>Focus on vulnerable groups (youth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repair water sources</td>
<td>Blanket approach</td>
<td>Community</td>
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<td>Water tanks</td>
<td>Schools and PLWD centres</td>
<td>Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Messaging</td>
<td>Blanket + emphasis on women and children (schools)</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Health camps</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psycho-social support</td>
<td>Focus on vulnerable groups (elderly, Dalit, women, children)</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Messaging</td>
<td>Blanket + emphasis on women (pregnant and lactating) and children</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Blanket approach</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5: Livelihoods CCGs targeting criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Criteria</th>
<th>Other Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• HH affected by the EQ and living in temporary/makeshift shelter</td>
<td>▪ Landholding less than 1 ropani in peri-urban area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• An earning member of the household deceased by earthquake</td>
<td>▪ HH belongs to Janajati, Dalit’s or a minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Women headed household, (single mother, divorced, widow, separated)</td>
<td>▪ HH with a member is suffering from chronic disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elderly member living by themselves and/or in charge of children</td>
<td>▪ HH who is food insecure for minimum 3 months in a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Household having no adult member between age group of (18 to 60 years) for income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Household has no regular income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Member of the HH is a person with disability who can make a living</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### XI. Annex: Evaluation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation questions</th>
<th>Working questions (evaluation sub-questions)</th>
<th>How judgement will be formed</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was the programme appropriate for meeting the needs of the different crisis-affected groups?</td>
<td>To what extent did target communities participate in the planning, design(^{177}) and implementation of the programme?</td>
<td>Self-reported involvement of local actors(^{178}) across the programme lifespan; Documented evidence of their involvement; Perception of programme implementers of the level of community participation.</td>
<td>Secondary data review. KIIIs with in-country BRC and NRCS staff, district-level stakeholders and wards, cluster members, DEC.(^{179}) FGDs with beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were the criteria for targeting appropriate to the needs and context?</td>
<td>Perception of programme implementers, local actors, DEC and beneficiaries that the targeting criteria suited the communities’ needs and contexts; Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are aware of the selection criteria; Formalised assessment of needs representative of the different crisis affected groups (i.e. gender, age, caste, ethnic minority, people living with disabilities).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent were the specific interventions</td>
<td>Perception of programme implementers, local actors, DEC and beneficiaries that interventions corresponded to needs;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{177}\) Including whether the targeting was community-led.  
\(^{178}\) Local actors refer to district-level stakeholders and wards. See Section XII for more information.  
\(^{179}\) See Section XII for a definition of the various stakeholders.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did the programme succeed in effectively achieving results?†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the programme achieved its intended outcomes?</td>
<td>Comparison of achievements against the logical framework.</td>
<td>Secondary data review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KIIs with in-country BRC and NRCS staff, district-level stakeholders and wards, cluster members, DEC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have all outputs contributed to intended outcomes?</td>
<td>Review monitoring information;</td>
<td>FGDs with beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What were the positive or negative unintended outcomes of the programme?</td>
<td>Perception of programme implementers, local actors, DEC, and beneficiaries on the sectoral and multi-sectoral effects of the programme.</td>
<td>Direct observation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review of documented unintended outcomes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the Recovery Programme reached and had a positive effect on the most vulnerable, in particular women, children and young people, people with disabilities?</td>
<td>Review monitoring information;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceptions of programme implementers, local actors, DEC, and beneficiaries on the programmes’ reach and effects on these groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† The evaluation will look at the effectiveness of implementing the programme through the BRC/NRCS partnership, rather than attribute results specifically to BRC or NRCS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>disabilities and people from different castes?</td>
<td>Perceptions of programme implementers, local actors, cluster members, DEC, and beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What would the situation have been in the target areas if the intervention had not taken place?</td>
<td>Review timeframe of programme implementation; Perceptions of programme implementers, local actors, DEC, and beneficiaries on the timeliness of the programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How timely has the delivery of outputs been in relation to need?</td>
<td>Choice of intervention modalities documented and formalised (specifically review response options analysis); All main areas of cash feasibility were checked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have different options for interventions been considered in the programme design?</td>
<td>Documented examples of programme decisions based on lessons learned and assessments; Perceptions of programme implementers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How were assessments and learning generated by the project used to reach the most vulnerable groups?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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181 “Options for interventions” is understood as type of modality (i.e. in-kind, cash, or voucher).
182 Community acceptance and needs, political acceptance and legal framework, market functionality, availability of reliable payment agents, operational conditions, VfM.
183 This question presents a rephrasing of the suggested question “Was finding used in the best possible way to reach the most vulnerable, and were different options considered?” This phrasing aims to clarify what “finding used” refers to, and has removed the part about considering other options because that is captured in the next evaluation sub-question.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How has the operational model enhanced Value for Money?</th>
<th>How effective have the mechanisms for communication, feedback and complaints been?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the total management and operational costs?</td>
<td>Documented examples of changes implemented based on feedback; Perceptions of programme implementers, local actors, and beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the scale of the programme appropriate and proportional to BRC and NRCS’ capacity, experience and mandate?</td>
<td>Review of the programme budget (including overview programme costs vs. direct programme costs); Example of cost saving through the use of shared resources between BRC and NRCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has BRC provided adequate technical, management and financial support to key interventions?</td>
<td>Perception of programme implementers and DEC; Review of mandate and documented gaps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent and in what ways has capacity building for NRCS translated into better management and operations?</td>
<td>Perception from BRC and NRCS that there is a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities; Perception from BRC and NRCS that there are effective ways of working; Documented examples of providing such support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of programme implementers and DEC that NRCS operations have become more effective.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The evaluators removed “What did BRC do to enhance identified capacity gaps?” from this question as that information will be captured in the following question “To what extent and in what ways has capacity building for NRCS translated into more effective operations at District Chapter (DC) and headquarters (HQ) levels?”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>more effective operations at District Chapter (DC) and headquarters (HQ) levels?</td>
<td>Perception of cluster members and local actors on the clear channels of communication with Red Cross and lack of overlapping activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How effective has the programme been in coordinating with external actors?</td>
<td>Perception of cluster members and local actors on the clear channels of communication with Red Cross and lack of overlapping activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the risks been identified and managed?</td>
<td>Formalised risk assessment and risk mitigation plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the programme contribute to sustainable changes in the lives of the crisis-affected population?</td>
<td>Perception of programme implementers, local actors, cluster members, and beneficiaries that outputs can continue without external assistance; Perception of programme implementers and local actors on the latter’s’ capacity to sustain programme outcomes; Local actors’ plans to ensure sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent can NRCS continue to deliver programming without further BRC support?</td>
<td>NRCS’ future programmatic plan; Perception of programme implementers on NRCS’ capacity to sustain programme outcomes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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185 External actors include government bodies, community organisations, NGOs, the private sector, and other Red Cross societies, e.g. Danish Red Cross.
XII. Annex: Detailed Methodology

The evaluation objectives were met through a highly participatory, mixed-method approach that relied on a variety of secondary and primary sources. It followed the steps below.

**Desk review & Inception phase:**

The evaluation started with an in-depth briefing with the consultancy manager on 5 April 2018. Beyond fostering a broad and general understanding of the programme background and of the evaluation’s ToR, this briefing helped to clarify the evaluators questions and begin discussions about sources of data.

Following the briefing, an extensive comprehensive desk review of the programme and overall humanitarian response documentation and monitoring data was conducted to 1) inform the design of the primary data collection tools and 2) provide information to use to triangulate the primary data’s findings. It included the BRC and NRCS documentation and monitoring data, and relevant external documentation. The consultants reviewed 93 documents, the full list of which can be found in Annex XVI. The desk review harnessed both qualitative and quantitative data (specifically monitoring data the programme implementers collected).

**Primary Data Collection:**

The lead evaluator conducted a field mission in Nepal from 23 April - 2 May 2018. During this visit the consultants collected primary data, \(^{186}\) in 16 wards. The visited wards included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Municipality and Ward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
<td>Kathmandu Metro Ward No. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarkeshwor Ward No. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarkeshwor Ward No. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarkeshwor Ward No. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarkeshwor Ward No. 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaktapur</td>
<td>Changunarayan Ward No. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changunarayan Ward No. 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{186}\) Data collection continued until 9 May to complete the remote KIIs, while the national consultants completed the FGDs and KIIs with local actors.
The primary data collection methods included:

- 63 semi-structured key informant interviews (KII) of the main stakeholders. This represents a significant increase from the planned 40 KII s as stated in the Inception Report. The list of interviewees is included in Annex XV and the questionnaire in Annex XIII. The selection was done purposefully, targeting people thought to be best able to contribute to the evaluation process. Key informants are representative of the following groups:
  - BRC and NRCS staff in HQ and the field;
  - District-level stakeholders (District Administrative Office, district level line ministries, etc.) and Wards (Ward representatives, committee representatives, etc.);
  - External actors (PNS, DEC members)
  - Disasters Emergency Committee in the donor function

The lead evaluator conducted one-to-one in-person interviews during the field mission with English-speaking informants at the HQ level, and the national consultants conducted the KII s in Nepali (i.e. with district-level stakeholders). The lead evaluator also conducted remote Skype interviews with relevant stakeholders based in the UK.

- 20 focus group discussions (FGDs) with programme beneficiaries. FGDs were used to gather feedback directly from the programme’s beneficiaries on the programme’s appropriateness, effectiveness, and sustainability, and to collect their suggestions for recommendations. They were conducted in Nepali by the national consultants. The FGDs were representative of various vulnerable groups (youth, elderly, PLWD, Dalit, Janajati) and done both as mixed groups and as women-only discussions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lalitpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• The facilitation methods incorporated the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) / Participatory Learning for Action (PLA) tools, as can be found in the FGD guide in Annex XIII. However, only four FGDs were able to complete these exercises due to time constraints during field collection and/or the evaluation team’s decision not to use PLA with certain groups where communication and their level of understanding were already challenging (e.g. FGDs with the elderly).

• Observations of the programmes implemented in the field. This included taking pictures to document examples of infrastructure projects.

Data analysis & final report:

Qualitative disaggregated data was recorded and coded to analyse emerging trends. The analysis was done iteratively to be able to adjust the data collection tools (as was done for the district level stakeholders KII and the FGD guides) and explore some of the trends more in-depth.

The secondary quantitative data was stored in excel, cleaned (as needed) and then analysed using computing descriptive statistics for the identified variables (specifically gender and age when feasible).

At the end of the fieldwork on 1 May, the consultants led a workshop with BRC and NRCS teams to present the preliminary findings, assess their consistency and discuss recommendations. That workshop has fed into the findings and recommendations presented in this report.

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XIII. Annex: KII questionnaire

Brief Background

Following the earthquakes in the spring of 2015, the British Red Cross (BRC) in partnership with the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) launched a large-scale multi-sectoral intervention comprising health, food livelihoods, shelter and WASH. This recovery programme also included a capacity building component for the NRCS as well as Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA). It was implemented in the three districts of Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur, across 75 urban, peri-urban and rural communities.

As the programme’s activities implemented with funding from the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) are coming to an end,\textsuperscript{188} the BRC has commissioned an external final evaluation.\textsuperscript{189} The purpose is to take stock of the BRC intervention since November 2015. The four main axes this evaluation will focus on are:

1. The appropriateness of the programme to meet the needs of the different crisis affected groups;
2. The effectiveness of the programme to achieve results;
3. The Value for Money of the operational model;
4. The sustained significant changes in the lives of the crisis-affected population to which the programme contributed.

The resulting recommendations will be used by BRC and NRCS stakeholders to inform and improve the remaining period of implementation of the response as well as future similar programmes.

The interview will last about 45 to 50 minutes. Everything we say will be used to inform the study, but nobody will be quoted individually.

Personal data collected will be used by Key Aid Consulting only for the sole purpose of the review and will not be forwarded to third parties.

Ask for interviewee’s consent.

Tell interviewee if and how he/she will see the results of this consultation (share final report or share findings orally through consultation based on group).

\textsuperscript{188} Activities funded by the BRC Nepal earthquake appeal will continue until the end of 2018.
\textsuperscript{189} Note: this evaluation does not include activities covered by Phase 1 (the response programme), nor activities that will continue after April 2018.
Instructions

This structured interview guide provides an overview of all the topics and corresponding questions, however each interview will be tailored to focus on the set of questions that are most directly relevant to the interviewee’s expertise and interest.

General information

Name:

Position:

Organisation:

Email address:

Project implementers (BRC and NRCS staff)

Introductory questions

1. What has been your involvement with the BRC/NRCS recovery programme? And over what time period?

Appropriateness

2. Can you provide a short description of the planning, design and implementation of the programme? How were the targeted communities involved in these steps? Was this sufficient? If they were not involved, why not?
3. What criteria did you use for targeting? Are beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries aware of them?
4. Were communities involved in determining the targeting criteria? If yes, how so? If not, why not?
5. How did you determine the needs and context of the targeted communities? Have you been able to assess the distinct needs of the different crisis affected groups?
6. In your opinion, did the targeting criteria that were used align to the determined needs and context? Why or why not?
7. In your opinion, were the interventions aligned to the communities’ identified needs? Why or why not?

Effectiveness

8. Are there any programme outcomes that have been difficult to achieve? If yes, why? Does this vary by sector?
9. What is the current status of Phase 2b’s outputs? Are there any that will not be achieved by the end of April? If yes, why?

10. Were there any unforeseen effects of the programme? If yes, can you provide some examples?

11. Has the programme been able to reach different groups, i.e. women, youth, older people, people living with disabilities and from different castes/ethnic groups?

12. If yes to the question above, what has been the programme’s effect(s) on these groups? Can you provide examples?

13. Have certain sectoral interventions been better at reaching these groups? What about in different geographic locations?

14. What do you think would be the current state of the communities covered by this programme if they had not received Red Cross support after the earthquake?

15. In your opinion, has BRC/NRCS been able to implement the programme in a timely fashion?

16. Were there any major delays in implementation? If yes, can you give an example or elaborate on the reasons behind this delay?

17. Has the programme’s implementation been quick enough to meet the beneficiaries’ needs? Please justify your answer.

18. How did you determine when/where to use conditional/unconditional cash grants? Did you do a cash feasibility assessment? (political/beneficiary acceptance, FSP, etc.)?

19. Have assessments carried out before the phase of the programme (i.e. the multi-sector assessment and scoping activities) or learning generated during implementation (i.e. exit survey, post distribution monitoring (PDM), etc.) helped the various activities reach targeted groups (i.e. women, older people, youth, specific minorities/castes, etc.)? Can you provide an example of how the targeting or programme implementation changed based on this information?

20. How have you ensured adequate communication with the programme’s beneficiaries?

21. What feedback and complaint systems have been put in place? In your opinion, are they being used?

22. Can you provide an example of how your organisation handled a complaint or feedback they received from a beneficiary?

**Value for Money**

- Do you think that your organisation had the capacity, experience and mandate to carry out the recovery programme? Why or why not?
• In your opinion, has BRC’s support been adequate to ensure the smooth running of the various interventions? (Including technical, management and financial assistance). Why or why not?
• In your opinion, is the separation of roles and responsibilities between BRC and NRCS clear? Can you describe them to me?
• How would you characterise the working relationship between BRC and NRCS?
• Have the various sectoral interventions been implemented in a collaborative fashion? Why or why not?
• What were some of the biggest challenges for implementing the programme gaps (i.e. lack of capacity or experience for certain activities, etc.)?
• In your opinion, was BRC aware of these gaps? If yes, how were they identified? If no, why not?
• Did BRC attempt to fill in these gaps? If yes, can you provide an example? If no, why not?
• In your opinion, does NRCS have the capacity to handle recovery programmes, increased as a result of this programme? Why or why not? If yes, can you provide an example?
• If yes to the question above, do you think this is true at both the HQ and district levels? Why or why not?
• Have you been satisfied with BRC/NRCS’ coordination with external actors (i.e. government bodies, community organisations, NGOs, the private sector, other Red Cross societies – e.g. Danish Red Cross)? Why or why not?
• What have been some of the biggest successes or challenges to coordination with external actors?
• How has BRC/NRCS identified potential risks to this programme?
• What did they do to manage these risks?
• In your opinion, have these efforts been sufficient? Why or why not?

Sustainability

• Do you think the progress that the programme has achieved thus far will remain without continued support of the Red Cross? Why or why not?
• Do you think local actors have the ability (i.e. knowledge, capacity) to sustain the programme’s achievements? Why or why not?
• Do you think NRCS has the ability to deliver programming in the valley in the future without BRC’s support? Why or why not?
For NRCS: what are your future programming plans over the next 2-3 years?

Wrap up questions

- If you were to start the programme all over again, what would you do differently?
- Is there anything that we did not discuss that you feel is important to highlight?

District-level stakeholders and ward-level stakeholders

Introductory questions

1. What has been your involvement with the BRC/NRCS recovery programme?

Appropriateness

2. Can you describe the role of your organisation in the planning, design and implementation (i.e. the various stages) of the programme?
3. Are you familiar with what the criteria for targeting were (i.e. how people or householders were selected to receive assistance)? If yes, can you explain them to me?
4. How were you involved in determining the targeting criteria (i.e. who was selected to receive assistance)?
5. In general, do you think the right people received assistance? Why or why not?
6. Do you think non-beneficiaries in your community understand why they were not targeted? Please explain.
7. Did BRC/NRCS consult you to determine the needs and context of your community? If yes, can you describe how this occurred?
8. In your opinion, did the programme’s activities help alleviate your community’s needs? Why or why not?

Effectiveness

9. In your opinion, what have been the major effects of the assistance provided? In other words, what has changed since people started to receive assistance?
10. To the best of your knowledge, has this assistance reached different types of groups, i.e. women, youth, older people, people living with disabilities and from different castes/ethnic groups? Why or why not?
11. If yes to the question above, what has been the assistance’s effect(s) on these groups? Can you provide examples?
12. What do you think would be the current state of your community if it had not received assistance from the Red Cross?
13. In your opinion, was assistance provided in a timely fashion? Was it quick enough to meet your community’s needs? Why or why not?
14. Were there any major delays in assistance being provided? If yes, can you give an example?
15. Have you been satisfied with the Red Cross’ level of communication with you? Why or why not?
16. Are you aware of any feedback or complaint systems that have been put in place? If yes, in your opinion, are they being used? Why or why not?
17. Can you provide an example of how the Red Cross handled a complaint or feedback they received from someone in your community?

Value for Money

18. During the course of this programme, have you noticed a change in the NRCS’s capacity to provide assistance? If yes, can you describe this change?
19. Have you been satisfied with the Red Cross’ efforts to coordinate with your organisation? Why or why not?
20. What have been some of the biggest successes or challenges to coordination?
21. Are there any overlapping activities in your community (between the Red Cross and another aid organisation)?

Sustainability

22. Do you think the effects the assistance has created in your community can remain without continued support of the Red Cross? Why or why not?
23. Are you confident in your and other local actors’ knowledge and capacity to maintain the programme’s positive changes? Why or why not?
24. What are your organisation’s plans to ensure the sustainability of these positive changes?

Wrap up questions

25. If the Red Cross were to start the programme all over again, what would you like them to do differently?
26. Is there anything that we did not discuss that you feel is important to highlight?

External actors (CWG, DEC members, etc.)

Introductory questions
1. What has been your involvement with the BRC/NRCS recovery programme?

**Appropriateness**

2. To what extent are you aware of BRC/NRCS need assessment? Was it shared externally?
3. Does the programme fit within your organisation’s strategy?

**Effectiveness**

4. In your opinion, was assistance provided in a timely fashion? Was it quick enough to meet the communities’ needs? Why or why not?
5. Were there any unforeseen effects of the programme? If yes, can you provide some examples?
6. Has the programme been able to reach different types of groups, i.e. women, youth, older people, people living with disabilities and please from different castes/ethnic groups?
7. If yes to the question above, what has been the programme’s effect(s) on these groups? Can you provide examples?
8. What do you think would be the current situation of the targeted communities if they had not received assistance from the Red Cross?
9. BRC/NRCS have used CCG for livelihoods and UCG for shelter. Have you also used CTP? Is it an effective modality to meet those needs in this context?

**Value for Money**

10. Have you been satisfied with BRC/NRCS’ coordination with your organisation? Why or why not?
11. What have been some of the biggest successes or challenges to coordination?
12. Are there any overlapping activities for the targeted communities (between the Red Cross and another aid organisation)?

**Sustainability**

13. Do you think the progress that the programme has achieved thus far will remain without continued support of the Red Cross? Why or why not?
14. Do you think NRCS has the knowledge and capacity to continue delivering programming without further support from BRC? Why or why not? What do you think can be done to further enhance their capacity and deliver better outputs?

**Wrap up questions**
15. If the Red Cross were to start the programme all over again, what would you like them to do differently?
16. Is there anything that we did not discuss that you feel is important to highlight?

**DEC (donor)**

**Introductory questions**
- What has been your involvement with the BRC/NRCS recovery programme?
- What are your expectations of this evaluation?

** Appropriateness**
- In your opinion, did BRC/NRCS involve targeted communities in the planning, design and implementation of the programme? Why or why not?
- What about for determining the targeting criteria?
- How did BRC/NRCS determine the needs and context of the targeted communities?
- In your opinion, did the targeting criteria that were used align to the determined needs and context? Why or why not?
- In your opinion, were the interventions aligned to the communities’ identified needs? Why or why not?

**Effectiveness**
- According to the periodic updates you receive, has the programme achieved its intended outcomes? Why or why not?
- Are you aware whether the programme been able to reach different types of groups, i.e. women, youth, older people, people living with disabilities and please from different castes/ethnic groups?
- If yes, does it appear that certain sectoral interventions been better at reaching these groups? What about in different geographic locations?
- What do you think would be the current state of the targeted communities if they had not received assistance from the Red Cross?
- In your opinion, has BRC/NRCS been able to implement the programme in a timely fashion? Why or why not?
- Are you aware of any assessments carried out before the phase of the programme (i.e. the multi-sector assessment or scoping exercise) or learning generated during implementation (i.e. post-distribution monitoring, exit surveys, etc.)? If yes, do they appear to have helped the various activities reach these groups? Why or why not?
• Are you aware of how BRC/NRCS determined when/where to use conditional/unconditional cash grants? If yes, please describe.

**Value for Money**

• Do you think that BRC/NRCS had the capacity, experience and mandate to carry out the recovery programme? Why or why not?
• In your opinion, has BRC’s support been adequate to ensure the smooth running on the various interventions? (Including technical, management and financial assistance). Why or why not?
• In your opinion, has NRCS capacity to handle recovery programmes increased as a result of this programme? Why or why not? If yes, can you provide an example?
• If yes to the question above, do you think this is true at both the HQ and district chapters levels? Why or why not?
• Have you been satisfied with BRC/NRCS’ coordination with external actors (i.e. government bodies, community organisations, NGOs, the private sector, other Red Cross societies – e.g. Danish Red Cross)? Why or why not?
• What are the synergies in between BRC/NRCS programme and the DEC appeal?
• What seem to have been some of the biggest successes or challenges to coordination with external actors?
• How has BRC/NRCS identified potential risks to this programme?
• What did they do to manage these risks?
• In your opinion, have these efforts been sufficient? Why or why not?

**Sustainability**

• Do you think the progress that the programme has achieved thus far will remain without continued support of the Red Cross? Why or why not?

**Wrap up questions**

• If the Red Cross were to start the programme all over again, what would you like them to do differently?
• Is there anything that we did not discuss that you feel is important to highlight?
XIV.  Annex: FGD guide

Instructions

NB: Background and general information are the same as for the KII questionnaire.

When conducting the FGDs be conscious of gender, minority groups, and of the time you are going to ask people to contribute (each FGD should be a maximum of 1 hour and 15 minutes). Be well prepared, know your questionnaire well and try to keep your group to a manageable size.

General Information

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<th>Data collection date</th>
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| Interviewer(s)       | 1.        |          |
|                      | 2.        |          |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee(s)</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role (Head of HH, etc.)</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
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Introduction Questions

1. Are you familiar with the Red Cross’ activities in your community?
2. What assistance have you received through this programme?

Appropriateness
3. Are you aware of why you were selected to receive assistance (or why you were not selected to receive assistance)? If yes, what was the reason?
4. Do you think the selection process was fair? If no, why?
5. Do you think the needy were the ones who received assistance in your community (i.e. women, older people, specific minority groups caste levels)? Why or why not?
6. Was the assistance you receive from the Red Cross what you needed? Why or why not?

Effectiveness

Utilise one Participatory Learning for Action (PLA) technique based on the sector that the participants have received assistance in:

- For those that received in-kind goods or have access to new facilities (WaSH and health): have participants map how they access the services/distributed goods.
- For those that receive cash grants (shelter and livelihoods): proportional piling
- For all others: mapping of daily activities before vs. after the intervention, and/or before vs. after the earthquake

7. What do you think would be the current state of your community if it had not received assistance from the Red Cross?
8. Did the assistance arrive quickly enough to help alleviate your need? Why or why not?
9. If yes, do you think the assistance has helped these various groups? Why or why not?
10. If you had a question about the assistance you receive, who would you ask about it? How would you go about doing so? (In other words, are they aware of how to give feedback?)
11. Have you done so? If yes, what happened? Did you receive a response?
12. How satisfied are you with how your voice has been heard? (if there are multiple respondents have them vote – satisfied, not satisfied, or neutral). Are you confident in the response?

Sustainability

13. Do you think the effects the assistance has created in your community can remain without continued support of the Red Cross? Why or why not?

Wrap up questions

14. If the Red Cross were to start the programme all over again, what would you like them to do differently?
15. Is there anything that we did not discuss that you feel is important to highlight?
XV. Annex: List of Key Informants

To comply with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation that entered into effect on 25 May 2018, specific information on interviewees has been removed, as interviews at the time did not secure written confirmation that their data could be shared publically.

Out of the 63 interviews, 59 were with stakeholders based in Nepal (the remaining four were based in the UK).

12 KIls were conducted with BRC, 19 with NRCS, 3 with other RCM members (e.g. other PNS and IFRC), 2 with other INGOs working on recovery in Nepal, 1 with DEC as a donor, and 26 with local stakeholders.
XVI. Annex: Documents reviewed


“Assessment Findings, Analysis, and Recommendations (RoA Shelter and WaSH),” 2016.


“BRC Charity Overview,” n.d.


———. “DEC Form 2 Phase 1 - Output Table BRC Nepal EQ,” 2015.

———. “DEC Form 3 - Phase 2b 6 Month Report,” 2017.


———. “DEC Form 4 - Phase 2b - Risk Register Nepal BRC,” 2017.

———. “DEC Form 4 - Risk Register BRC,” 2017.

———. “DEC Form 7 Phase 2a Narrative Plan British Red Cross,” 2015.

———. “DEC Form 8 - Phase 2 - Output Table Phase 2 Final,” 2017.
——. “DEC Form 8 Phase 2a Output Table BRC,” 2016.
——. “DEC Form 11 Phase 2 BRC 6 Month Narrative Report,” 2016.
——. “DEC Form 12 - Phase 2b - Plan BRC,” 2017.
——. “DEC Form 13 - Phase 2b - Output Table BRC,” 2018.
——. “ER0 Outcome Indicators, MOVEMENTWIDE RECOVERY PLAN,” n.d.
——. “ER0-Health Logframe_MnE_WP_Budget_BB_MB_baseline Data Analysis,” n.d.
——. “Options and Approaches to Ensure Sustainable WASH Interventions for Recovery Projects,” n.d.
——. “PASSA Discussion - Kathmandu Valley,” n.d.


“Cash For Work Guidance SOPs,” n.d.

“Copy of DEC-Proposal 18 Months for NRCS,” n.d.


“Final Ward Selection,” n.d.


“Mapping BRC and Oxfam Working Area and Sectors in Ktm Valley.” Oxfam and BRC, n.d.


“Project Level Template for Assessment Findings, Analysis, and Recommendations,” n.d.


“What to Consider When Deciding to Use Cash Transfers,” n.d.